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“AFFORDABLE HOUSING” AS METAPHOR
Steven J. Eagle*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the varying and often-conflicting meanings and
goals ascribed to the term “affordable housing.” It asserts that the term
often serves as a metaphor; it obscures rather than clarifies, and
contributes to the intractability of problems pertaining to housing from any
perspective. The Article further asserts that attempts to deal with what are
termed affordable housing issues must realistically take into account the
shelter, cultural, and economic needs of various populations, and also the
effects of housing decisions on economic prosperity. Above all, the
affordable housing metaphor is agreeable precisely because it defers
responding to the need to make hard choices about priorities and funding.
Among proffered affordable housing goals are making available an
ample supply of housing in different price ranges; attracting and retaining
residents who contribute to the growth and economic prosperity of cities;
and ensuring that neighborhood housing remains available for existing
residents, while preserving their cultural values. Other goals include
providing adequate housing in high-cost cities for low- and moderateincome individuals and families, and the overlapping concern for “fair
housing” for persons of all races and backgrounds.
After considering these often conflicting goals, the Article examines the
benefits and detriments of various means of providing more affordable
housing, including fair-share mandates, rent control, and inclusionary
zoning (including whether that leads to impermissible government takings
of private property). It then briefly considers the merits and demerits of
federal subsidy programs.
The Article briefly considers conceptual and practical problems in
implementing the Supreme Court’s 2015 Inclusive Communities disparate
impact holding and HUD’s 2015 regulations on “Affirmatively Furthering
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Fair Housing,” especially in light of the 2016 elections. Finally, it
discusses how the concept of “affordable housing” conflates the separate
issues of high housing prices and poverty and how housing prices might be
reduced through removal of regulatory barriers to new construction.
Throughout, the Article stresses that advancing affordable housing goals
has both explicit and implicit costs and that goals often are conflicting. To
those ends, it employs economic, sociological, and legal perspectives.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article asserts that what commonly is called the problem of
“affordable housing”1 has largely been intractable because it is a conflation
of many separate societal problems and goals. Affordable housing is a
metaphor invoked by diverse interest groups to define issues and choices in
their favor, so that they might more effectively attempt to shape public
policy.
Metaphors, according to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, “can have
the power to define reality . . . through a coherent network of entailments
that highlight some features of reality and hide others.”2 They add that
“acceptance of the metaphor, which leads us to focus only on those aspects
of our experience that it highlights, forces us to view the entailments of the
metaphor as being true . . . .”3
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman utilized the similar organizing
principle of the “decision frame,” which they defined as “the decisionmaker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated
with a particular choice.”4 While the frame is “controlled partly by the

1. There is an extensive legal literature on affordable housing. See, e.g., BRUCE KATZ
ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., RETHINKING LOCAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING STRATEGIES:
LESSONS FROM 70 YEARS OF POLICY AND PRACTICE (2003); J. Peter Byrne & Michael
Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (2007); Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s
Contributions to Both Affordable Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J.
585, 593 (2015); Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing:
Systemic Issues Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413 (2004).
2. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 157-58 (1980).
3. Id.
4. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981).
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formulation of the problem,” it also is controlled “partly by the norms,
habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker.”5
In more pithy language, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler observed that
Tversky and Kahneman “didn’t care for metaphors.”6 “They replace
genuine uncertainty about the world with semantic ambiguity. A metaphor
is a cover-up.”7
This Article attempts to bring “genuine uncertainty” to the fore of the
affordable housing debate. It discusses how decisions about where people
live, the identity of their neighbors, the types of amenities they might
enjoy, and regional prosperity are interrelated in multifaceted ways. The
apparently intractable shortage of “affordable housing” in many American
cities results from inconsistent housing goals and the lack of a societal
consensus on how to prioritize and fund the advancement of these goals. It
further asserts that “affordable housing” should be defined and analyzed in
a broad context, taking into account the shelter, cultural, and economic
needs of various populations, as well as the effects of housing decisions on
economic prosperity. This definition is broader than the more conventional
emphasis on housing for low- and moderate-income families.8 However, a
broader view permits a more realistic, comprehensive, and effective
approach toward housing issues.
The Article focuses on three different affordable housing goals. One is
developing an ample supply of housing in price ranges that attract and
retain residents conducive to the growth and economic prosperity of cities.9
Two major problems are that governments have created extensive barriers
to the creation of new housing at the behest of existing residents10 and that
the concept of “affordable housing” has different meanings for middleclass families, moderate-income families, and poor families.
A second affordable housing goal is ensuring that neighborhood housing
remains available for existing residents, while preserving their cultural and
other non-pecuniary values.11 This goal is associated with resistance to
gentrification in minority and lower-income neighborhoods and resistance

5. Id.
6. Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, The Two Friends Who Changed How We Think
About How We Think, NEW YORKER (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com
/books/page-turner/the-two-friends-who-changed-how-we-think-about-how-we-think
[https://perma.cc/JRV3-CTAC].
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Byrne & Diamond, supra note 1 (focusing on housing opportunities for
low-income persons within the context of a comprehensive set of goals that such housing
might achieve).
9. See infra Section I.D.
10. See infra Section II.F.
11. See infra Section I.E.
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to densification and concomitant environmental concerns in more upscale
areas. More generally, neighborhood preservation often is in opposition to
economic growth.
Finally, “affordable housing,” in its most familiar sense, refers to the
provision of adequate housing in high-cost cities for low- and moderateincome persons and the overlapping concern for “fair housing” for families
of all races and backgrounds.12 Governments have long made special
provisions for housing, since the provision of physical shelter and a locus
for intimate family relationships serves fundamental needs.13 But this
raises many questions, such as whether affordable housing not only
encompasses safe and adequate shelter but also neighborhood integration,
economic and cultural opportunity, and equal dignity. It is important to
come to grips, as well, with the essential conflation of housing
unaffordability and poverty. As leading urban economists have flatly
stated, “a housing affordability crisis means that housing is expensive
relative to its fundamental costs of production—not that people are poor.”14
The lack of a societal consensus on the importance and priority of
housing objectives tends to perpetuate the status quo. The most direct
government responses to affordable housing needs, massive government
housing subsidies and substantially increased residential density, are
politically unpalatable. This encourages local government responses
marked by a lack of transparency, logrolling, inefficiency, opportunities for
favoritism, and disregard for private property rights.
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s recent adoption of “disparate
impact” analysis in fair housing determinations in Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project15 and
HUD’s subsequent promulgation of rules on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing,”16 it is likely that the federal judicial and executive branches will
become more immersed in local housing decisions. But that might place
the federal government in the role of closely supervising local land-use
practices more generally, a role it has resisted in other contexts. It is highly

12. See infra Sections II.C and II.E.
13. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 1, at 529.
14. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions on
Housing Affordability, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 21, 21 (2003),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/03v09n2/0306glae.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FXB-5AYB]. See Glaeser & Gyourko, infra note 375 and accompanying
text for a more extensive quotation.
15. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (upholding the use of “disparate impact” as a test for
determining if local housing regulations or actions violate the Fair Housing Act).
16. HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.).
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problematic that President Donald J. Trump or HUD Secretary Ben Carson
would support this approach.17
Many solutions to narrow aspects of the affordable housing problem
seem tenable in theory, although perhaps not in practice. Without a broad
change in political will leading to a consensus on goals and priorities, more
comprehensive solutions will remain elusive. In approaching affordable
housing issues, it is important to recall, as the central theme in well-known
books by Jonathan Haidt18 and George Lakoff19 demonstrate, that people of
good will have different moral frameworks, as well as different life
experiences.
I. THE DIVERSE GOALS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING
A.

The Purposes of the City

Affordable housing, however defined, must be evaluated in the context
of the purposes that the city is to serve. Should cities primarily facilitate
religious or social values, the production of goods or economic
transactions, or consumerism?20 One beginning point is that they should
facilitate human values and the nurturing of families.21 However, in our
disparate society, these are political problems with no clear answers. The
eminent mid-twentieth century political scientist Harold Lasswell did not
define “politics” in terms of rational decision-making based on
comprehensive data. Rather, as the title of his classic book, Politics: Who
Gets What, When, How,22 suggests, politics is a practical contest for power,
with elites having a very substantial advantage. That does not mean, of
course, that those who have little political power and who feel displaced
from home or community yield gracefully.
In dealing with affordable housing, it is tempting to be ruled by abstract
and overarching principles, applicable to broad populations and geographic
regions. However, as Jane Jacobs wryly noted in The Death and Life of
Great American Cities,23 a “region” might be defined as “an area safely

17. See infra Section II.E.
18. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY
POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012).
19. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK
(2016).
20. To be sure, decisions involving cities often have substantial spillovers, and there
often are mismatches between the legal decision-making powers of cities, suburbs, regional
authorities, state governments, and their relative competencies to deal with problems. See,
e.g., Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515
(2007). These issues generally are beyond the scope of this Article.
21. See JOEL KOTKIN, THE HUMAN CITY: URBANISM FOR THE REST OF US 5-18 (2016).
22. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1936).
23. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
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larger than the last one to whose problems we found no solution.”24 This
insight pertains to housing, as well. Economic prosperity, community
cohesiveness, societal fairness, and government transparency and honesty
are discrete problems for which we have not found good solutions.
Combining them under the rubric of top-down edicts for “affordable
housing” is unlikely to be more successful. On the other hand, modest
efforts, building upon a Burkean notion of incremental change, might be
more prudent and ultimately desirable.25
Questions about what kind of city we want imply assumptions about
whether decisions are to be made by individuals or collectively by
government. In considering private actors, this Article assumes that
decisions are made by developers acting largely as proxies for their
ultimate residential purchasers and by existing homeowners to maximize
some combination of pecuniary value and subjective desires.
In
considering government decision-making, this Article assumes
participation by tenants, businesses, environmentalists, and other local,
regional, and state interest groups, as well as by owners and developers.
This multiplicity of stakeholders attenuates government concerns about
future residents. Navigating the system of government permits and
subsidies, thus, makes developers more attuned to political deal-making
and rent-seeking than to pleasing prospective purchasers.26
There is no necessarily ideal model for the American city. David
Brooks recently noted that two types of urban places in America seem to be
functioning well. The first are “dense, highly educated, highly communal
places . . . . These cities, like Austin, Seattle and San Francisco, have lots
of innovation, lots of cultural amenities, but high housing prices and lots of
inequality.”27 The second are “opportunity cities like Houston, Dallas and
Salt Lake City. These places are less regulated, so it’s easier to start a
business. They are sprawling with easy, hodgepodge housing construction,
so the cost of living is low. Immigrants flock to them.”28
Brooks urged that there be a debate between these “two successful ways
to create prosperity, each with strengths and weaknesses. That would be a
forward-looking debate between groups who are open, confident and
innovative.”29 The debate “might divide by cultural values and aesthetics,

24. Id. at 410.
25. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Oxford Univ.
Press 1993) (1790) (advocating incremental political change arising from a society’s
customs and traditions, as opposed to sweeping reforms based on theory).
26. See infra Sections II.D, II.F.
27. David Brooks, Where America Is Working, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2016, at A23.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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[but] wouldn’t divide along ugly racial lines.”30 In public exchanges, alas,
issues involving personal aspirations, social class, race, and substantial
illiquid housing investments typically do not readily lend themselves to
reasoned debate. We often do not ask others to understand and try to
accommodate our needs and desires as fellow citizens and neighbors but,
rather, engage in “rights talk,” demanding that others yield to our alleged
legal entitlements.31
Thus, our dialogue often proceeds not through civil discourse but, rather,
through the promulgation of ordinances and regulations demanding either
densification or large-lot zoning, lawsuits objecting to development
approvals based on often-ostensible environmental concerns, and judicial
challenges to community growth that disparately affect legally protected
groups, without regard to intent. Recourse to the legal system, for better or
worse, often imposes substantial additional expense and delay.32 Those, or
their threat, often are sufficient to sink a residential development project.33
Where individuals make choices regarding their own residences, the
aggregate of their separate decisions weighs heavily on overall housing
patterns and availability. As Thomas Schelling demonstrated with respect
to “neighborhood tipping,” individual choices interact in ways not
necessarily anticipated, or even desired, by the people involved.34
Furthermore, prospective new residents are the most sensitive to
neighborhood characteristics, and possible buyers often look carefully at
the racial and socioeconomic makeup of neighborhoods.35
B.

Costs are Constraints

Individuals often express preferences for all of the following:
inexpensive housing, economic vibrancy and growth, and maintenance of
existing neighborhood values and ways of life. “Neighborhood values,” in
turn, might include resisting gentrification and supporting institutions
furthering the ethnic and cultural needs of lower-income groups.
Conversely, they might include maintaining the low densities and high
30. Id. (alteration in original).
31. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991) (noting that foreign observers are struck by the extent to which legal
discourse and lawyers have permeated and influenced American ways of life).
32. See, e.g., Lisa C. Goodheart & Karen A. McQuire, Revisiting the Issue of Causation
in CERCLA Contribution Litigation, 82 MASS. L. REV. 315, 322 (1998) (noting the “great
expense, delays and other burdens associated with protracted environmental litigation”).
33. See infra notes 382-85 and accompanying text for a vivid example.
34. Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC.
143, 181-86 (1971).
35. See Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, (Pub. L. and Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 575, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2762026 [https://perma.cc/L3VH-U6EW].
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amenities favored by more upscale communities. Such preferences
typically are articulated without apparent regard for their inconsistent
nature, or the burdens they impose upon others.
Thus, even before examining various affordable housing goals, it is
necessary to inject the concept of costs. No less than goods denominated
as “free,” goods termed “affordable” often have high implicit costs.36
“Costs,” as economists use the term, refers to the “highest-valued
opportunity necessarily forsaken” in order to obtain the good in question.37
While “costs” often are identified as the pecuniary value of goods traded in
markets, the concept is broader than that and includes subjective
tradeoffs.38 When individuals make decisions for themselves, it generally
is assumed that they accurately judge their relative likes and dislikes,
although a considerable literature has developed in recent years asserting
that they make systematic errors.39
Some scholars dismiss the distinction between normative and positive
economic analysis and assert that economics cannot be value-free40 and
that the provision of affordable housing sometimes is linked to moral
obligation.41 However, regardless of one’s views about the objectivity or
subjectivity of economics, in a world of scarce resources, “economic actors
cannot pursue every course of action with positive expected value” but,
instead, “must make decisions by comparing the value of alternatives.”42

36. See, e.g., DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING (2005) (asserting
that mandatory parking requirements result in excessive land set aside for parking and are
triggered by concerns of existing homeowners and businesses that newcomers otherwise
would occupy scarce public parking spaces, which are a public good only because
municipalities insufficiently charge for their use).
37. See Armen A. Alchian, Cost (1968), reprinted in ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC
FORCES AT WORK 301 (1977).
38. See Karen I. Vaughn, Does It Matter That Costs Are Subjective?, 46 SOUTHERN
ECON. J. 702 (1980). “[C]ost is an all pervasive concept that reaches to the core of economic
thinking. Economic decision making is an exercise in choosing among alternatives, and
cost can only be understood to be a personal subjective evaluation of the consequences of
choice.” Id. at 702.
39. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
40. See, e.g., THE END OF VALUE-FREE ECONOMICS (Hilary Putnam & Vivian Walsh
eds., 2012).
41. See, e.g., Sam Stonefield, Affordable Housing in Suburbia: The Importance but
Limited Power and Effectiveness of the State Override Tool, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323,
346-47 (2001) (asserting that providing urban families access to affordable suburban
educational, employment, and other opportunities “serves the national and moral goal of
increasing equality of opportunity”).
42. Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 51, 78 (2015).
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Alas, with housing, as with the environment, considerations are
interrelated.43
C.

Residents of American Cities are Burdened by High Housing
Costs

Recent reports suggest that urban rents often create hardships for
residents. According to a 2016 Furman Center study, “[i]n both 2006 and
2014, a majority of renters in all but three of the largest metro areas were
rent burdened, meaning their rents were equal to at least 30 percent of their
income.”44 The study also noted that “[i]n all but four of the largest metro
areas, at least a quarter of renters were severely rent burdened in 2014,
meaning they faced rents equal to at least half their household income.”45
Perhaps notably, of the eleven largest metro areas, Dallas and Houston
were the only two to be more affordable than metros nationwide.46 A 2016
National Low Income Housing Coalition study stated,
[I]n no state, metropolitan area, or county can a full-time worker earning
the prevailing minimum wage afford a modest two-bedroom apartment.
In only twelve counties and one metropolitan area is the prevailing
minimum wage sufficient to afford a modest one-bedroom apartment.47

The squeeze between rising rents and low incomes has particularly affected
minority and low-income neighborhoods.48
Similarly, the National Low Income Housing Coalition concluded that
“[w]hile stagnant wages for lower-income workers are contributing to
rental affordability challenges, the findings suggest a dearth of low-cost
supply is also a culprit.”49 “Of 370,000 multifamily rental units completed
from 2012 to 2014 in 54 U.S. metropolitan areas, 82% were in the luxury

43. See JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 91 (Sierra Club Books 1988)
(1911) (“When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in
the universe.”).
44. Ingrid Gould Ellen & Brian Karfunkel, Renting in America’s Largest Metropolitan
Areas, NYU Furman Center/Capital One National Affordable Rental Housing Landscape
Research Study 21 (Mar. 8, 2016).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Out of Reach 2016, NAT’L LOW HOUSING COALITION 1 (2016), http://nlihc.org/sites/
default/files/oor/OOR_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLN2-VUTD].
48. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, The State of the Nation’s
Housing 2015, (2015), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/jchs-sonhr2015-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y4S-DFC9] (noting a 2014 housing market “fueled” by
more renter households, but in which “the number of housing cost-burdened renters set
another record,” and “a number of minority and low-income neighborhoods remain severely
distressed”).
49. NAT’L LOW HOUSING COALITION, supra note 47, at 1.
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category, well out of reach for low-income earners.”50 Furthermore, “[i]n
more expensive cities, the numbers are particularly daunting. A family in
the San Francisco metro area would need to earn nearly $35 an hour to
afford a one-bedroom apartment and $44 to afford a two-bedroom
apartment.”51 These numbers do not take into account unreported work in
the “informal economy.”52
While affordable housing concerns often focus on low- and moderateincome individuals and families, large segments of the middle class are
affected as well. A 2016 Pew Research Center report noted that the middle
class is shrinking in most American cities, to the extent that “it may no
longer be the economic majority in the U.S.”53 The report added that “the
national trend is the result of widespread declines in localities all around
the country.”54
Despite highly publicized concerns that education debts present a unique
impediment to home purchase for college graduates, young people without
college degrees face large hurdles to achieving home ownership.55
According to Brookings Institution scholars Elizabeth Kneebone, Carey
Nadeau, and Alan Berube, “[t]here also is evidence that, as poverty has
increasingly suburbanized this decade, new clusters of low-income
neighborhoods have emerged beyond the urban core in many of the
nation’s largest metro areas.”56 The poor in the suburbs often are
concentrated in lower-income communities, with little access to middleclass amenities or opportunities, yet lacking safety-net resources more
readily available in urban areas.57
Thus, in the wake of the Great Recession, homeowners have become
tenants, financially squeezing lower-income tenants in metropolitan areas.

50. Laura Kusisto, No Relief in Sight for Minimum-Wage Renters, WALL. ST. J., May 25,
2016, at A2.
51. Id.
52. See Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires From Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373
(2006) (discussing conceptual and practical problems regarding the nature of “work” and
societal support for those earning undisclosed income).
53. Pew Research Center, America’s Shrinking Middle Class: A Close Look at Changes
Within Metropolitan Areas (May 11, 2016) (citing Pew Research Center, The American
Middle Class Is Losing Ground: No Longer the Majority and Falling Behind Financially
(Dec. 2015)).
54. Id.
55. Kusisto, supra note 50.
56. Elizabeth Kneebone, et al., The Re-Emergence of Concentrated Poverty:
Metropolitan Trends in the 2000s, BROOKINGS INST. 19 (Nov. 2011), http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/03-poverty-kneebone-nadeau-berube/1103_pov
erty_kneebone_nadeau_berube.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DKF-X63W].
57. Id.
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This results in personal hardship and also affects area economies, as will be
discussed next.
D.

Affordable Housing as Conducive to Economic Prosperity

In each of its varying meanings, good arguments are made that
affordable housing is conducive to economic prosperity. However, as
always, there are significant tradeoffs.
1.

Housing Attracting and Retaining Productive Residents

Unnecessary restrictions on new housing in economically vibrant areas
raise housing prices, which discourages productive workers from moving
in or remaining and harms the regional and national economies. Those
were important conclusions of a recent study of the role that housing prices
and availability play in attracting and retaining skilled and talented workers
by Professors Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti.58
Their intent was to study how the economic growth of individual cities
determined the growth of nations. Hsieh and Moretti used a research
model in which workers were free to move and where local labor demand
reflects factors like “infrastructure, industry mix, agglomeration
economies, human capital spillovers, access to non-tradable inputs and
local entrepreneurship” that affect the overall productivity of firms.59 They
added that the “local labor supply reflects amenities and housing supply.”60
After exploring the relationship of productivity and wages in various
cities, Hsieh and Moretti noted that, “if labor is more productive in some
areas than in others, then aggregate output may be increased by reallocating
some workers from low productivity areas to high productivity ones.”61
However, in very productive cities, higher productivity was reflected in
higher nominal wages rather than in productive workers moving in. They
discussed, as an example, Silicon Valley, where natural amenities could be
preserved while stringent land-use regulations governing “underutilized
land within its urban core” could be relaxed so that the housing supply
could be “greatly expanded.”62 “Our findings indicate that in general
equilibrium; this would raise income and welfare of all US workers.”63
Thus, Hsieh and Moretti concluded:
58. See generally Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local
Growth and Aggregate Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
21154, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21154.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CQ4-QE2D].
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. at 35 (citing Edward Glaeser, Land Use Restrictions and Other Barriers to
Growth, Cato Inst. (2014)).
63. Id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
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[T]hree quarters of aggregate U.S. growth between 1964 and 2009 was
due to growth in Southern U.S. cities and a group of 19 other cities.
Although labor productivity and labor demand grew most rapidly in New
York, San Francisco, and San Jose thanks to a concentration of human
capital intensive industries like high tech and finance, growth in these
three cities had limited benefits for the U.S. as a whole. The reason is that
the main effect of the fast productivity growth in New York, San
Francisco, and San Jose was an increase in local housing prices and local
wages, not in employment.64

Similarly, Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag concluded that the United
States is “increasingly characterized by segregation along economic
dimensions, with limited access for most workers to America’s most
productive cities.”65 As an example of this phenomenon, Edward Glaeser
noted that the Houston area is gaining population at a rate much faster than
the New York area, although New Yorkers are better educated and have
higher wages. While home prices in New York and other major coastal
cities are unaffordable for average workers, prices in Houston are not.66
2.

Adequate Housing for Low- and Moderate-Income Families
Buttresses Economic Growth

Workforce housing has become an important part of the affordable
housing landscape. The term describes “housing that is affordable to
working families and individuals who do not qualify for housing
subsidies.”67
Through workforce housing initiatives, including
“inclusionary zoning laws, a reduction in regulatory barriers, the creation
of housing trust funds, the provision of ‘gap funding’ measures, and
incentives for employer-assisted housing initiatives,” some localities have
tried to respond to the need for firefighters, teachers, and other employees
to commute for long distances.68
According to Professor Tim Iglesias, “[t]he public appeal of such
programs is the functional necessity of these workers for the city’s
harmonious operation and the consequent need to enable these workers to
live within the jurisdiction.”69 Politically, of course, this appeals to
64. Id. at 34.
65. Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S.
Declined? (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP12-028, 2013), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2081216 [https://perma.cc/E9Q6-G59C].
66. EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION MAKES
US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 186 (2011).
67. Matthew J. Parlow, Whither Workforce Housing?, 23 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY.
DEV. L. 373, 384 (2015).
68. Id. at 374-75.
69. Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 580 (2007).
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homeowners and other taxpayers because the beneficiaries will be
preforming services they need and also because the beneficiaries’ status as
gainfully employed helps shield them from the stigma of being undeserving
of assistance.
3.

Gentrification as Conducive to Prosperity

The often-maligned phenomenon of gentrification also is an engine for
urban prosperity. While the damage to existing neighborhood ways of life
that result from gentrification will be discussed subsequently,70 it is
important to note that the gentrification of existing neighborhoods provides
both neighborhood business opportunities and places of residence for
productive workers who otherwise might relocate to other cities. Professor
J. Peter Byrne conceded that individuals have been displaced through their
loss of affordable apartments, but asserted that “increases in the number of
affluent and well-educated residents is plainly good for cities, on balance,
by increasing the number of residents who can pay taxes, purchase local
goods and services, and support the city in state and federal political
processes.”71 He added:
My contention here goes somewhat further: gentrification is good on
balance for the poor and ethnic minorities. The most negative effect of
gentrification, the reduction in affordable housing, results primarily not
from gentrification itself, but from the persistent failure of government to
produce or secure affordable housing more generally. Moreover, cities
that attract more affluent residents are more able to aggressively finance
affordable housing. Thus, gentrification is entitled to “two cheers,” if not
three, given that it enhances the political and economic positions of all,
but exacerbates the harms imposed on the poor by the failures of national
affordable housing policies.72

Explicit disagreement with Professor Byrne’s assessment has not so
much challenged his view of gentrification as conducive to economic
development as it has the notion that communal values should be
subordinated.73
4.

Preservation of Existing Close-Knit Communities Can Abet Prosperity

While gentrification is conducive to economic prosperity, preservation
of existing neighborhoods, although providing primarily social and cultural
benefits for existing residents, has economic development aspects as well.
“Many ethnic inner city neighborhoods in US cities are rich in traditions,

70.
71.
72.
73.

See infra Section I.E.2 (discussing gentrification’s harms).
J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 405-06 (2003).
Id. at 406.
See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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history, art, and cuisine,” but also suffer the effects of decline.74 “In the
face of a growing popularity of cultural tourism, an opportunity exists to
explore how neighborhood cultural assets can be used to promote economic
development in such neighborhoods.”75 The difficult challenge is to obtain
the economic advantages of tourism while maintaining neighborhood
authenticity.
E.

Affordable Housing as Supportive of Existing Community

One goal of affordable housing is strengthening the ability of people to
remain and thrive in their existing communities. However, the term
“community” elides the deep divisions between universality and
particularity. As the political theorist Michael Walzer noted, communities
are marked by their character as “historically stable, ongoing associations
of men and women with some special commitment to one another and
some special sense of their common life.”76 Professor Kenneth Stahl added
that, “the very notion of community, however broadly conceived, is
dependent on exclusion.”77 He attributed the NIMBY (“not in my
backyard”) impulse as “merely an outward manifestation of this deeply
embedded and widely shared desire to preserve community.”78
The tension between abiding by the wishes of existing residents and
mandating change to benefit potential newcomers permeates affordable
housing issues.79
1.

Social Capital

On a physical level, existing communities are built of infrastructure,
commercial and institutional buildings, and residences. But what makes
communities and holds them together is social capital. In his well-known
book Bowling Alone,80 sociologist Robert Putnam noted that, “[w]hereas
physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to
properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among
individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them.”81

74. Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris & Konstantina Soureli, Cultural Tourism as an
Economic Development Strategy for Ethnic Neighborhoods, 26 ECON. DEV. Q. 50, 50 (2012).
75. Id.
76. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 62 (1984).
77. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion 5 (Dale E. Fowler Sch. of Law,
Chapman Univ., Working Paper No. 16-05, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2770185
[https://perma.cc/P66B-S8KP].
78. Id. Stahl also favored inclusion. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
80. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000).
81. Id. at 19.
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Social capital often is considered in the contexts of low-income and
minority communities resisting gentrification and of more affluent
communities resisting change. However, a community need not be
affluent, nor fear affluence, to resist change. For instance, leaders of the
remnant of the Orthodox Jewish community on New York City’s Lower
East Side have resisted the construction of affordable housing in order to
help keep their community intact.82
Despite the promise of the notion that affordable housing will bring
disparate groups together, melding and strengthening their social capital, it
might actually be problematic. Professor Robert Ellickson is skeptical.83
He discussed Putnam’s newer publication, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and
Community in the Twenty-First Century.84
After reviewing the vast literature on the consequences of the integration
of neighborhoods, particularly by race and ethnicity, Putnam comes to
sobering conclusions. He asserts that residents of diverse neighborhoods
have less social capital than do residents of more homogeneous
neighborhoods. Moreover, the members of an ethnic group who live in a
relatively integrated neighborhood are likely to have weaker ties to other
members of their own ethnic group than they would if they lived in an
ethnic enclave. Putnam affirms his support for integration, but he is
compelled by his findings to shift his emphasis to the long-term benefits
of neighborhood diversity.85

Other less-publicized studies similarly cast doubt on the traditional view
that economic integration gives rise to significant social benefits. Ellickson
also discussed Philip Oreopoulos’ finding that growing up in a poor
neighborhood does not, by itself, lead to worse outcomes for children, and

82. See Josh Nathan-Kazis, How One Funeral and 2 Dead Men Walking Herald Epic
Shift on the Jewish Lower East Side, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (July 24, 2016),
http://forward.com/news/national/345770/how-one-funeral-and-2-dead-men-walking-herald
-epic-shift-on-the-jewish-lowe/ [https://perma.cc/9QVE-5Y6D]. “For decades [leaders]
held off a city redevelopment plan that would have brought new low-income housing into
the neighborhood, while bolstering the institutions and social services that kept their
community intact.” Id.; see also Ronda Kaysen, New Mixed-Income Housing on the Lower
East Side, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1IrT4Vl [https://perma.cc/2HULKKLG] (noting that “some groups [are] calling for only affordable housing and others
demanding none.”).
83. Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57
UCLA L. REV. 983 (2010).
84. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First
Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007).
85. Ellickson, supra note 83, at 1014-15 (discussing Putnam, supra note 84, at 149-51,
156, 163-65).
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his results indicate that a child’s household environment has a far greater
effect than a child’s neighborhood environment.86
2.

Gentrification as Harmful to Community

“Gentrification” generally has come to be understood to be “the process
by which higher income households displace lower income [households] of
a neighborhood, changing the essential character and flavor of that
neighborhood.”87 It has been referred to as “changing the character of a
neighborhood from one that reflects distinct ethnic and class needs and
cultural traditions into a bland emporium for expensive consumer goods.”88
As Judge Higginbotham observed, “[t]his process often causes the eviction
of the less affluent residents who can no longer afford the increasingly
expensive housing in their neighborhood.”89 This definition is not
dissimilar from what apparently was the first usage of the term
“gentrification” in 1964 by Ruth Glass.90 She used the term to describe
[T]he “invasion” of members of the middle and upper classes into
traditionally working-class neighborhoods, resulting in the displacement
of incumbent residents and a change of the social character of the
neighborhood. This definition can be broken down into two interrelated
components. First, gentrification raises the economic level of a
neighborhood population. Second, gentrification changes the ‘social
character’ or culture of neighborhoods.91

What has been styled the “chaos and complexity of gentrification”92
results from the fact that some scholars have attempted to ascertain the
existence of gentrification through quantitative data, while others have used
qualitative data, which is much richer, but results in complex,
multidimensional definitions.93
However it is measured, Judge
Higginbotham described gentrification as a “deceptive term” masking the

86. Id. (discussing Philip Oreopoulos, The Long-Run Consequences of Living in a Poor
Neighborhood, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1533 (2003)).
87. Maureen Kennedy & Paul Leonard, Dealing with Neighborhood Change: A Primer
on Gentrification and Policy Choices, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URB. & METRO. POL’Y 6
(2001),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/gentrification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8ZU-6B8P].
88. Byrne, supra note 71, at 405 (internal references omitted).
89. Business Ass’n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 874 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981).
90. RUTH GLASS, LONDON: ASPECTS OF CHANGE xviii (1964).
91. Michael Barton, An Exploration of the Importance of the Strategy Used to Identify
Gentrification, 53 URB. STUD. 92, 93 (2016).
92. See generally Robert A. Beauregard, The Chaos and Complexity of Gentrification,
in NEIL SMITH & PETER WILLIAMS, GENTRIFICATION OF THE CITY 35-55 (1986).
93. Barton, supra note 91, at 93.
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“dire consequences” to “less affluent residents who bear the brunt of the
change.”94
A consequence of gentrification is the “displacement of low-income
renters who are unable to afford rental price increases, those evicted by
landlords who want to upgrade the building for a new clientele, [and] lowincome homeowners unable to afford increased property taxes . . . ”95
Eviction, in turn, can lead to substantial and prolonged deprivation.96
In light of these negative effects, Professor Jon Dubin has advocated “a
right to protective zoning in low-income communities of color.”97 This
right would resist “noxious commercial or industrial uses which undermine
the quality of the residential environment and discourage continued
residencies.”98 Dubin added:
Higher-grade zoning, zoning or planning measures that induce certain
higher-quality residential or other uses can produce similar incompatible
and disruptive results. These higher-cost uses create market pressures that
effectively price out existing low-income residents through the process of
gentrification. Residents subjected to incompatible upzoning face the
prospect of involuntary displacement and the functional and
psychological trauma of dislocation and perhaps homelessness.99

Likewise, Professor Erika Watson has argued that urban school districts
implement certain reforms to attract white middle-class gentrifiers by
giving them more viable high-quality options.100 However, such reforms
“harm poor and minority students by disproportionally displacing them
from their neighborhood public schools while simultaneously limiting the
number of quality public and charter schools available to them.”101
Professor Peter Byrne’s generally positive view of gentrification, quoted
earlier,102 has been challenged on grounds that he exalts pecuniary values

94. Business Ass’n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 874 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981).
95. Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 12 (2006).
96. See generally MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE
AMERICAN CITY (2016). See also Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of
Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOC. 88, 91 (2012) (noting that “eviction often increases material
hardship, decreases residential security, and brings about prolonged periods of
homelessness . . . . In inner-city neighborhoods, it is women who disproportionately face
eviction’s fallout.”).
97. Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating A Right to Protective
Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 744 (1993).
98. Id. at 742.
99. Id. at 742-43.
100. Erika K. Wilson, Gentrification and Urban Public School Reforms: The Interest
Divergence Dilemma, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 711 (2015).
101. Id. at 678.
102. See Byrne supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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over community values and views gentrification “through a decidedly
white, upper-class, market-driven lens.”103 Overall, gentrification is a good
example of what Joseph Schumpeter termed the process of “creative
destruction,” whereby innovation results in benefits to society at the cost of
eliminating outmoded structures and products.104 In the context of
affordable housing, the merits and demerits of community development are
manifold, subtle, and intermixed.105 Unfortunately, substantial theoretical
and practical challenges have so far prevented efforts to quantify or
prioritize in an objective manner the increases and decreases to human
welfare that result or how those gains and losses should best be
distributed.106
3.

Middle or Upper-Middle Class Way of Life

Just as the metaphor of “gentrification” signifies displacement of a
culture and way of life of racial and ethnic minorities and lower-income
individuals, terms such as “densification,” “environmental degradation,”
“apartments in residential neighborhoods” and the like signify
displacement within the frame of reference of a middle- or upper-middleclass way of life. A century ago, the rise of the automobile and the ensuing
enhanced mobility for ordinary people was a powerful motivator for the
spread of zoning.107 The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was
adopted in New York City at the behest of Fifth Avenue merchants, who
were anxious to shield their clientele from teeming immigrants working in
new high-rise loft buildings nearby.108
In the seminal case upholding comprehensive zoning, Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.,109 Justice Sutherland gratuitously explained that
apartment houses (then often “tenements”) “come very near to being

103. John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two”:
Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433,
434 (2003). The authors further note that “[g]entrification is good for neither cities nor the
poor (nor for gentrifiers like Byrne for that matter), unless we disrupt the market in pursuit
of a more egalitarian goal: the creation of integrated life opportunities for all people in all
places.” Id. at 434.
104. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (2d ed. 1947).
105. See Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia Salkin, Can Urban University Expansion and
Sustainable Development Co-Exist?: A Case Study in Progress on Columbia University, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 637, 688-96 (2010) (presenting a thoughtful array of benefits and costs
of gentrification).
106. See Vaughn supra note 38 and accompanying text.
107. See Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in
the United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 137, 140 (1999) (noting that
Euclidean zoning and the emergence of the automobile began to establish the first distant
“suburbs”).
108. SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 173, 180 (1969).
109. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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nuisances”110 and that “very often the apartment house is a mere parasite,
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.”111 Indeed,
homeownership is widely assumed to bring numerous advantages to the
community, including civic participation,112 although this approach
recently has been disputed.113
Professors Lee Anne Fennell and Julie Roin have described that the
financial stakes of homeowners are important in describing the extent to
which they will be civic-minded and cooperative.114 They note that the
home is the single largest financial asset of most homeowners and that
because the home is a highly undiversified investment, they are quite
concerned about the risk of loss.115 What they term “understaked”
households are in danger of losing their homes through foreclosure or
gentrification; “overstaked” households, more typical of upper-income
groups, resist change that would harm their investments. To a greater or
lesser extent, “[a]ll homeowners have an incentive to stop new housing
because if developers build too many homes, prices fall, and housing is
many families’ main asset.”116 Ultimately, Fennell and Roin suggest both
over- and under-investment in individual homes create conflicts and pit
communities against each other.117
Consistent with those concerns, a recent study found that “[i]n areas
where affordable housing developments are viewed as an amenity, higher
income households are willing to pay more for proximity. Conversely,
higher income households are willing to pay more to live further away
from affordable housing developments in areas where such properties are
viewed as a disamenity.”118
110. Id. at 395. The case was about land intended for industrial use, and did not involve
residential zoning.
111. Id. at 394.
112. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Public Interest, Public Choice, and the Cult of
Homeownership, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 843, 848-49 (2012).
113. See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 890 (2011) (challenging whether “citizenship virtues” flow from
homeownership).
114. Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 143, 143-44 (2010).
115. Id. at 144 n.4 (citing, inter alia, WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS
9 (2001)).
116. Derek Thompson, Why Middle-Class Americans Can’t Afford to Live in Liberal
Cities, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/why
-are-liberal-cities-so-unaffordable/382045/
[https://perma.cc/WQ7G-ASZH]
(quoting
UCLA economist Matthew Kahn).
117. See Fennell & Roin supra note 114, at 143-44.
118. Rebecca Diamond & Timothy McQuade, Who Wants Affordable Housing in Their
Backyard? An Equilibrium Analysis of Low Income Property Development 27 (Nat’l Bureau
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In recent decades, the disengagement of the upper middle class from the
more extensive community might have substantially increased. Richard
Reeves has argued that “[t]he American upper middle class is separating,
slowly but surely, from the rest of society.”119 Whereas “the top fifth have
been prospering while the majority lags behind . . . [,] [g]aps are growing
on a whole range of dimensions, including family structure, education,
lifestyle, and geography.”120 Also, “[s]egregation of affluence not only
concentrates income and wealth in a small number of communities, but
also concentrates social capital and political power. As a result, any selfinterested investment the rich make in their own communities has little
chance of ‘spilling over’ to benefit middle- and low-income families.”121
The cutting edge of this class-based separation appears to involve the
quest by affluent parents for neighborhoods with excellent schools. While
wealthy parents are pouring money into enrichment programs for their
children, “[t]he biggest investment the rich can make in their kids,
though—one with equally profound consequences for the poor—has less to
do with ‘enrichment’ than real estate.”122 Such parents “can buy their
children pricey homes in nice neighborhoods with good school districts.”123
Indeed, for some home buying parents who are willing to commute
extreme distances, “there is no factor more important than the public
schools their children will attend.”124
Recent research by sociologist Ann Owens examined income
segregation from 1990 to 2010 in America’s hundred largest metropolitan
areas and concluded that income segregation among childless households
had “changed little and is half as large as among households with
children.”125 She noted:
Rising income inequality provided high-income households more
resources, and parents used these resources to purchase housing in

of Econ. Research Working Paper 22204, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22204.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X37Y-VGU3].
119. Richard Reeves, The Dangerous Separation of the American Upper Middle Class,
BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/
posts/2015/09/03-separation-upper-middle-class-reeves [https://perma.cc/2XTR-HFCW].
120. Id.
121. SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, THE CONTINUING INCREASE IN INCOME
SEGREGATION 14 (2016) (emphasis added).
122. Emily Badger, Study: Upscale Neighborhood Best Gift Parents Can Buy Kids,
WASH. POST, May 11, 2016, at A12.
123. Id.
124. See Katy McLaughlin, The New Kids on the Block, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2017, at
M1 (describing, inter alia, an attorney couple where one telecommutes and the other drives
165 miles each way to the office).
125. Ann Owens, Inequality in Children’s Contexts: Income Segregation of Households
With and Without Children, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 549, 549 (2016).
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particular neighborhoods, with residential decisions structured, in part, by
school district boundaries. Overall, results indicate that children face
greater and increasing stratification in neighborhood contexts than do all
residents, and this has implications for growing inequalities in their future
outcomes.126

The fact that high incomes are correlated with separation in residential
and cultural patterns should come as no surprise. Neither should the fact
that, while people pay obeisance to all having equal starts in life, they work
to provide advantages to their own children. In an era of meritocracy,
where income from professional achievement far outstrips income from
inherited wealth, it likewise is no surprise that “[e]ducation-as-inheritance
crowds out education-as-opportunity.”127
While the term “meritocracy” was coined as a satire on the British
educational system128 and neglects the structural impediments to
opportunity faced by many,129 most Americans understand that term to
describe the United States, “a place where those most deserving of power,
wealth, and influence will succeed through innate aptitude and hard work.
Conversely, those lacking natural talents will fail under the weight of their
own inadequacies.”130 This, perhaps even more than the self-interest of
some, describes why the value system of many Americans looks askance at
fairness as equality and why achieving a societal consensus willing to
sacrifice for low- and moderate-income housing assistance would be so
difficult.131
II. EXPLORING SOLUTIONS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROBLEMS
As previously noted,132 methods of providing more affordable housing,
however the term is defined, come replete with explicit and implicit costs.
Indeed, many aspects of the affordable housing problem reflect that those
who might benefit from affordable units do not have the ability to buy or
rent them. This might simply be a function of the individuals not being
able to afford the cost of erecting or rehabilitating the units. However, it
might also be a function of regulatory barriers created by zoning and other
126. Id.
127. See generally Palma Joy Strand, Education-As-Inheritance Crowds Out EducationAs-Opportunity, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 283, (2015).
128. MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 11 (Transaction Publishers 1994)
(1958).
129. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. See also Aaron N. Taylor,
Reimagining Merit as Achievement, 44 N.M. L. REV. 1, 29 (2014) (asserting that “[t]he
transmission of cultural norms is the primary means by which families militate against
equality of opportunity.”).
130. Taylor, supra note 129, at 18.
131. See infra Section II.E.5.
132. See supra Section I.B.
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government restrictions or of racial or class prejudice, perhaps manifested
through the actions of local officials.
Houston, which epitomizes the free market approach, has little in the
way of land-use controls and inexpensive housing. San Francisco, which
epitomizes heavy government regulation, has extremely high housing
prices and an affordability crisis. Whether San Francisco regulations are
“artificial,” or Houston’s laissez faire approach is indifferent to the general
welfare, depends on one’s perspective.
A.

Expert versus Market Decision-Making

For economists such as Robert Nelson, zoning functions as a property
right, giving neighborhood residents “a collective property right to their
common neighborhood environment.”133 On the other hand, for Charles
Haar, the specification in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act that
zoning be “in accordance with a comprehensive plan”134 was crucial.135
As described by Professors Roderick Hills and David Schleicher,136
“Haar took properly planned zoning to be a communal effort to wrest
control of a community’s development away from land-use markets—what
he called ‘the evil of uncontrolled growth’ and the ‘principle of profit
maximization.’”137 The comprehensive plan would be the standard against
which courts would weigh the local legislature’s small-scale zoning
changes. “This quality of trumping local zoning laws gave plans their
‘constitutional’ status.”138
Yet planners have come to realize that social interactions and changes in
technology make land use dynamic so that planning should have a time
frame of, perhaps, five years and twenty-five years, at most.139 Also,
professional planners bring their own biases to their work, including
favoring dense central business districts, multi-family housing, and open

133. ROBERT NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 146-47 (2005) (arguing that by transferring the right to exclude from the
individual to the community, zoning becomes a private property right belonging to the
community of homeowners).
134. A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (Dep’t of Commerce 1926).
135. Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 Harv. L. Rev.
1154, 1155-56 (1955).
136. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA
L. REV. 91 (2015).
137. Id. at 99 (citing Charles M. Haar, Reflections on Euclid: Social Contract and Private
Purpose, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 333, 344-48, 351
(Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989)).
138. Id.
139. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 70
(4th ed. 2013).
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space.140 It is not professional expertise that gives rise to the legitimacy of
land-use planning, Professor Carol Rose observed, but, rather, the intimate
knowledge that local legislators have of their constituents’ values and
needs.141 Furthermore, planners have no particular ability to presage
community needs in the future.142
Combining the legitimacy of local elected officials and the knowledge
implicit in markets, economist William Fischel advocated that officials and
developers bargain over the conditions under which specific projects might
be built.143 Charles Tiebout advanced a different view of the bargaining
model, describing how localities compete for residents and tax monies.144
Under the “Tiebout hypothesis,” individuals and communities alike take
into account the benefits, as well as the costs, associated with the
individual’s potential entry into the polity. Potential residents consider the
menu of services and amenities to be found in each locale and offset those
by taxes to be paid and disamenities incurred. Some localities might
prosper by offering low services and low taxes or, conversely, high services
and high taxes. However, municipalities decidedly discourage or zone out
those who would pay low taxes and demand expensive services, such as
low-income families with many children who have to be educated. The
Tiebout hypothesis has been criticized as failing to take into account that
changes in a community’s tax base “will be offset by an equal and opposite
change in another community’s tax base. And any increase in the number
of children in the community’s public schools will be offset by an equal
and opposite decrease in school enrollment somewhere else.”145

140. William L.C. Wheaton, Operations Research for Metropolitan Planning, 29 J. AM.
INST. PLANNERS 250, 254-57 (1963) (outlining planners’ biases).
141. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 867-70 (1983).
142. See, e.g., Michael Lewyn & Judd Schechtman, No Parking Anytime: The Legality
and Wisdom of Maximum Parking and Minimum Density Requirements, 54 WASHBURN L.J.
285, 293-94 (2015) (observing that “in the long run, any attempt to establishing the ‘right’
amount of parking by bureaucratic mandate, rather than through the market, creates a risk of
absurd results.”).
143. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 75-101 (1985).
144. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
145. Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 34 (1996).
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Some Affordable Housing Issues
1.

Is Housing a Right?

The U.S. Supreme Court effectively held in 1972 that there is no
Constitutional right to housing.146 “Because housing has been denied
fundamental right status with its attendant strict scrutiny standard of
review,” Professor Ann Burkhart noted, “federal and state courts routinely
have rejected attempts by the poor to obtain adequate shelter despite the
extremely hard facts that these cases often present.”147 On the other hand,
several international treaties and declarations have embodied a right to
housing,148 and housing has been defended as a basic human right.149 It is
in the context of housing as a “basic human need” that subsidized housing
for the poor has been defended as preferable to simple wealth transfers.150
That said, in the United States, “the private sector may choose to
participate in developing affordable housing, but it rarely does so unless the
state provides deep discounts.”151
Responding to suggestions from international organizations that
everyone should have secure housing tenure and be free from forced
evictions,152 Professors John McGinnis and Ilya Somin noted that such
provisions might have their place in a regime of government-provided
housing. “We do, however, believe that it is clear that a housing system
that depends on private enterprise, including contractual freedom between
renters and owners, has virtues and should not be limited by international
fiat.”153

146. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (upholding state wrongful detainer statute
against tenants who withheld rent). Subsequent circuit court cases interpreted Lindsey to
mean that there is no constitutional right to housing. See, e.g., Perry v. Hous. Auth., 664
F.2d 1210, 1217 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that the district court cited Lindsey for the
proposition that there is no constitutional right to housing).
147. Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 211, 212 (2003).
148. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
(Dec. 10, 1948).
149. See Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L.
REV. 245, 253 (2015) (asserting that the right to housing “vitiates against arguments that
housing is merely a commodity, and that an unfettered market always optimally and
equitably allocates housing entitlements.”); Frank I. Michelman, The Advent of a Right to
Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 207 (1970).
150. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 1, at 529.
151. Katherine Hannah, Carrying Out the Promise: How Shared Equity Models Can Save
Affordable Housing, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 521, 528 (2016).
152. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 148.
153. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1781-82 (2009).
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Affordable Housing and Fair Housing

The problem of affordable housing for low-income and minority groups
relates broadly to the role of communities. Concerns about income and
social class seem indelibly mixed with concerns about race and ethnicity,
both as a proxy for other issues and as a discrete and separate factor.
“Neighborhood tipping” plays an important role.154
According to Professor James Kushner, the nature of urban communities
changed after World War II.155 Massive movements to the suburbs,
together with strict racial segregation, marked the period through 1968.
During the next phase, through 1975, there was “hyper-sprawl, the loss of
the central city economic base and population, and hyper-segregation.”156
The subsequent period, through 1990, was “characterized by class
segregation, increased cost to access the suburbs, and increased class and
racial separation.”
Thereafter, through 2008, urban communities
“witnessed hyper-segregation; voluntary class, racial, and ethnic
separation; and persistent racial discrimination.”157
In her article The Fair Housing Choice Myth, Stacy Seicshnaydre
examined “why racial segregation persists in residential neighborhoods
despite the fact that the nation codified the policy of equal housing
opportunity over four decades ago.”158 She noted that, regardless of
income or crime rate, “[a]s the number of minorities in a neighborhood
increases, it becomes increasingly undesirable to whites, particularly if the
minority residents are black or Hispanic.”159 Perhaps concomitantly,
“people of color perceive overwhelmingly white neighborhoods as
unwelcoming or hostile; they thus gravitate towards neighborhoods that
have already achieved some integration.”160
In terming the lack of HUD enforcement of fair housing a “missing link”
between law and real housing opportunity, Seicshnaydre declared “HUD
must do more than dismantle ghettos and allow local governments to
decide whether to provide housing choice.”161

154. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
155. James A. Kushner, Urban Neighborhood Regeneration and the Phases of
Community Evolution After World War II in the United States, 41 IND. L. REV. 575 (2008).
156. Id. at 575.
157. Id.
158. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 23 J. AFFORD. HOUS. &
CMTY. DEV. L. 149, 149 (2015).
159. Id. at 165.
160. Id. at 166 (quoting Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Can We Live Together? Racial
Preferences and Neighborhood Outcomes, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND
HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005)).
161. Id. at 195. See also infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
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In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision upholding the use
of “disparate impact” as a test for housing discrimination in Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project162 and HUD’s subsequent promulgation of rules on “Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing,”163 many new developments undoubtedly will
occur.164
3.

Is Income Inequality in Cities Undesirable?

While income inequality within cities sometimes is berated, it is not
necessarily a bad thing. Douglas Rae has argued that “[t]hose of us who
want better life chances for low-earning households in major cities should
set out to increase inequality by attracting and keeping high earners, now
greatly underrepresented in central city populations.”165 Similarly, thenoutgoing mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, “suggested New Yorkers would
benefit if the income gap were even wider because the wealthy pay for a
big portion of city services.”166 The very wealthy, he added,
are the ones that pay a lot of the taxes. They’re the ones that spend a lot
of money in the stores and restaurants and create a big chunk of our
economy . . . [a]nd we take tax revenues from those people to help people
throughout the entire rest of the spectrum.167

4.

Should We Benefit People or Benefit Places?

As Professor Kenneth Stahl noted, “[p]erhaps one of the most pressing
issues for city governments today is whether they best serve their
constituents by focusing on people or on places.”168 The view that
government assistance should be directed toward individuals has two bases.
The first, as summarized by Stahl, is that we can “alleviate poverty by
issuing housing vouchers to enable the urban poor to escape from
devastated ghettos, and deter criminality with crackdowns that emphasize
the draconian consequences of poor choices.”169

162. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
163. HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.)
164. See infra Section II.E for discussion.
165. Douglas W. Rae, Two Cheers for Very Unequal Incomes: Toward Social Justice in
Central Cities, in JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS (Clarissa Rile Hayward & Todd
Swanstrom eds., 2011).
166. Michael Howard Saul, City News: Mayor Welcomes the Rich, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
2013, at A17.
167. Id.
168. Kenneth A. Stahl, Mobility and Community in Urban Policy: An Essay on Great
American City by Robert J. Sampson, 46 URB. LAW. 625, 625 (2014).
169. Id. at 625-26 (footnote omitted).
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Stahl states as an additional advantage that those with “decreasing
attachments to particular places” might be “lure[d]” by cities “with highquality services and amenities.”170 But the authorities he cites for that
proposition mostly emphasize how prospering cities can attract talented
people, most of all those Richard Florida calls the “creative class” and not
those in need of affordable housing assistance.171 To the extent that
strivers have been attracted to prosperous American cities in the past, it is
primarily because they have sought opportunity in areas with higher
incomes.172
Notably, Professor John Mangin has observed that, in recent decades,
the highest growth rates are in regions with income below the national
median, and “the regions with the highest incomes have been growing
more slowly than the national average. The most likely culprit is that, for
the first time in American history, people are migrating toward low housing
costs rather than toward high incomes.”173 Providing government benefits
to low-income individuals, instead of places, can help them to relocate to
parts of the country with better job and social opportunities.174
Presumably, discerning better opportunities would take housing costs into
account.
Advocates that government aid should benefit places, as Stahl notes,
“believe that urban policy must be directed at strengthening the
communities that shape people’s lives rather than treating community as a
disposable consumer good.”175 To be sure, people are ineluctably products
of their environment so that “people cannot improve their fortunes simply
by fleeing bad neighborhoods for good ones because, in an important sense,
‘neighborhoods choose people’ rather than the reverse.”176
More
practically, low-to-middle income people often are reliant on nearby family
and friends for assistance and do not readily have the capital to establish
themselves elsewhere, especially without a guaranteed job at the
destination city. Also, the political process that provides affordable

170. Id. at 625 (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 625 n.2 (citing RICHARD L. FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND
HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002);
GLAESER, supra note 66; JOEL KOTKIN, THE CITY: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2005)).
172. See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 93
n.7 (2014).
173. Id.
174. See Randall Crane & Michael Manville, People or Place?: Revisiting the Who
Versus the Where of Urban Development, LAND LINES: LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y 1 (July
2008),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/1403_719_lla080702.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CF5N-2UPZ].
175. Stahl, supra note 168, at 626.
176. Id. (discussing and quoting SAMPSON, supra note 168, at 327).
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housing and other assistance is itself heavily place-based and gives little
support to funding that would facilitate a move out of town.
A similar argument for place-based assistance is made by Professors
Rebecca Diamond and Timothy McQuade:
Our results show that affordable housing development has large welfare
impacts as a place based policy, which more than offset the welfare
impacts to tenants living in affordable housing. Given the goals of many
affordable housing policies is to decrease income and racial segregation in
housing markets, these goals might be achieved by investing in affordable
housing in low income and high minority areas, which will then spark inmigration of high income and a more racially diverse set of residents.177

Low-income neighborhoods can benefit from government-sponsored
enterprise zones, redevelopment, Tax Increment Financing (“TIF”) and
similar programs.178 In addition, spatial public goods, such as safety,
education, and transit, can help as well. However, improvements in city
neighborhoods make them more attractive to newcomers, and the market
value of those amenities is capitalized into real estate values. Owners of
apartment buildings, other commercial properties, and homeowners are the
beneficiaries. Residential and commercial tenants are not benefitted and
might face displacement through gentrification.
Whether our decision frame is predicated on “distressed communities”
or “distressed cities” greatly affects ensuing public policy choices.
5.

Housing Affordability for Different Income Groups

In a political and social context, “affordable housing” might be framed
as a middle income family’s ability to buy a home in a “good”
neighborhood, a working class family’s ability to rent an apartment in an
area with civic associations and decent schools, or a low income family’s
ability to reside in a habitable apartment in a secure area. These
generalizations are inherently incompletely defined and contestable.
Should affordable housing include social equality, cultural amenities,
and opportunities for advancement for all? Complicating this issue is the
fact that housing in excess of minimal shelter is what Fred Hirsch termed a
“positional good,”179 one which we value not for its intrinsic merit but
because others don’t have it. Reviewing Professor Robert Frank’s Falling
Behind,180 Thomas Leonard noted that Frank’s “big idea” is that the
consumption of positional goods “leads to expenditure arms races that

177.
178.
179.
180.

Diamond & McQuade, supra note 118, at 27.
See infra Section II.E.1 for discussion.
FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 27 (1976).
ROBERT H. FRANK, FALLING BEHIND: HOW RISING INEQUALITY HARMS THE MIDDLE
CLASS (2007).
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make all consumers of the positional good worse off. In other words, when
what we want depends upon what others have, a consumption externality
arises, and getting what we want will be inefficient.”181 Leonard adds that
“status hunger is in genes,” and cites the example of owners who prefer
homes of 3000 square-feet where their neighbors have only 2000 squarefeet, as opposed to having homes of 4000 square-feet, where the neighbors
have homes of 6000 square-feet.182
The problem of whether government-incentivized affordable housing for
lower-income groups should provide the dignity and status for which their
wealthier neighbors pay large sums is epitomized by the recent “poor door”
controversy in Manhattan.183 Market-rate buyers in a luxury high-rise
condominium pay up to $25 million for their units, for which they expect
amenities such as “concierge service, entertainment rooms, and
unobstructed views of the Hudson River and miles beyond.”184 As the New
York Times noted, “[t]he project will also cater to renters who make no
more than about $50,000. They will not share the same perks, and they
will also not share the same entrance.”185 The fact that low- or moderateincome families might have separate entrances, street addresses, and
amenities has split advocates for affordable housing. Some argue for
equality of persons and others for practical accommodations leading to the
construction of more affordable units.186
The same issue is presented more broadly in connection with the
location of affordable and adequate housing units in areas both with and
without neighborhood cultural, educational, and other amenities. Professor
Tim Iglesias has noted that the legislative history of the federal Fair
Housing Act described the goal of “integration” being “truly integrated and
balanced living patterns.”187 He delineated two models of integration, the
“traditional integration model” and the “individual access to the
opportunity structure model.”188

181. Thomas C. Leonard, Robert H. Frank, Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality
Harms the Middle Class, 19 CONST. POL. ECON. 158, 159 (2008) (book review).
182. Id.
183. See Mireya Navarro, “Poor Door” in a New York Tower Opens a Fight Over
Affordable Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1mNRrSf [https://perma.cc/
S55C-2VWC]. Under New York City’s 421-A subsidized inclusionary zoning program, the
affordable units had to be located on-site. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting advocates).
187. Iglesias, supra note 1, at 593 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. S3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20,
1968) (comments of Sen. Mondale)).
188. Id. at 594-98.
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While the “traditional” model focuses on the racial and socioeconomic
makeup of a given area and the relationship of the people who live there,
the second model “focuses on how location of a household relates to the
‘opportunity structure’ of a community (e.g. good schools, good jobs,
decent shopping, healthy neighborhoods, etc.).”189 As applied to the “poor
door” controversy, Iglesias observed that comingling of residents was
important under the “traditional” model but that, for the “access to
opportunity” model, it is a location that facilitates access to good schools,
jobs, and the like that counts.190
An important distinction between the traditional and opportunity
structure models is how they should regard extensive and efficient
metropolitan transport networks. Housing built on relatively inexpensive
land in the metropolitan periphery is inherently more affordable but might
bring to mind the banlieues of Paris, the favelas of Brazil, or similar
isolated racial or ethnic areas in the outskirts of large American cities.
Using a traditional view of integration, such construction would be most
problematic. On the other hand, with the important proviso that an
adequate transportation system be available, housing in such areas would
have easy access to the cultural, educational, and employment opportunities
that the “opportunity structure” demands.191
Provision of such a transportation infrastructure would not be easy. In
addition to the high cost of environmental review and physical
construction, a sufficient legal infrastructure would have to be created.192
At present, the New York City subway system is dominant in American
heavy rail metropolitan transit systems, and its ridership has grown in
recent years, while ridership elsewhere in the U.S. has declined.193 The
Community Development Project has concluded that the “documented
benefits” of better transit and smart growth include “providing affordable
housing for residents with low income around major transit stops;

189. Id. at 594.
190. Id. at 596.
191. The value of new rail systems is vigorously contested. See, e.g., Randal O’Toole,
“Paint Is Cheaper Than Rails:” Why Congress Should Abolish New Starts, CATO INST.
POL’Y ANALYSIS No. 727 (June 19, 2013), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/
pdf/pa727_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX72-PBLH].
192. See David Schleicher, How Land Use Law Impedes Transportation Innovation (Yale
Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 565, 2016) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2763696
[https://perma.cc/XTY7-VPZ2].
193. See Wendell Cox, New York’s Incredible Subway, NEW GEOGRAPHY BLOG (May 19,
2016),
http://www.newgeography.com/content/005255-new-yorks-incredible-subway
[https://perma.cc/97QX-UJ95] (citing annual data published by the American Public
Transportation Association showing that, from 2005-2015, ridership on the New York City
Subway increased nearly one billion trips, whereas on services elsewhere, there was a loss
of nearly two hundred million riders).
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increasing community access to jobs, services, and amenities.”194 It warns,
however, that other impacts include “increased housing prices,
neighborhood gentrification, . . . and fewer opportunities for affordable
housing developers who are priced out of the market.”195
While crediting NIMBYism as an effort to preserve community,196
Professor Stahl argues that “inclusion is an equally essential component of
community,” and that “if we desire a community that features housing for
all socioeconomic classes, we may have to accept some degree of class
segregation within the community.”197 He deems the “challenge of
inclusion” the attempt “to determine how much segregation is necessary to
achieve a diverse and inclusive community.”198 Stahl suggests that a
“[diverse] municipality as a federation of [homogeneous] neighborhoods”
might be better than an attempt at “granular-level integration.”199
Do Americans, in fact, “desire a community that features housing for all
socioeconomic classes”? Individuals affirming that sentiment might seek
to relocate to integrated communities, perhaps taking advantage of public
incentives and private donations to do so.200 Where legal mandates are
concerned, it might be difficult to discern whether the voters regard them as
merely aspirational or to be implemented elsewhere, as opposed to directly
affecting their own communities (be they municipalities or neighborhoods).
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that communities are pulling
apart. As Robert Putnam noted in his most recent book, Our Kids: The
American Dream in Crisis,201 in the 1950s there were “decent opportunities
for all the kids in town,” but now kids in poorer areas “can barely imagine
the future that awaits the kids” in wealthier neighborhoods.202
6.

Are People and Places Distinguishable?

Just as Robert Sampson’s work demonstrated that people are the product
of their places,203 so are places the product of their people.204 While it is
194. Community Development Project at Public Counsel, Getting There Together: Tools
to Advocate for Inclusive Development Near Transit, 21 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L.
1, 2 (2012).
195. Id. (internal citation omitted).
196. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
197. Stahl, supra note 77, at 5.
198. Id. at 5-6.
199. Id. at 38-39.
200. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated
Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 925-26 (2006) (describing
Shaker Heights, Ohio, where private donations funded low cost mortgage loans to
integrating homebuyers).
201. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRISIS 1 (2015).
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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tempting to say that uplifting communities exist and that people would
enjoy better life prospects by moving to them, Professor Lee Anne Fennell,
referring to “participant assembly problems,” asserted that people don’t just
come to an attractive place; rather, people are the place.205 The notion of a
successful place refers to the benefits from agglomeration of
complementary resources, such as the firms in a specialized industry and
workers skilled in its crafts.206
Urban interaction space can be conceptualized as a type of commons. It
presents the threat of overcrowding or overharvesting, but it also poses
the risk of undercultivation if it fails to attract parties who are well suited
to generate agglomeration benefits. The method for rationing access to
prime urban space should, therefore, select not only for the value that
users place on locating in particular spots, but also for those users’
agglomeration-friendly and congestion-mitigating traits . . . . The
challenge is to assemble participants together whose joint consumption
and production activities will maximize social value.207

This point is important, because it makes more explicit that the
Tieboutian model of competition among localities for new residents
potentially extends far beyond the tax monies such residents might supply
or demand.208
C.

State and Local Land-Use Mandates

State and local land-use laws affect types and supply of housing in
general and, particularly, the availability of affordable housing. As an
example, such local requirements as large-lot zoning benefit existing
residents, since the “market value of each homeowner’s property will rise
as the lot size minimum is increased.”209 Those prospective buyers
subsequently finding houses in the community unaffordable will “bid[] up
housing prices wherever they go.”210
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,211 Justice Sutherland’s
opinion broadly upheld comprehensive zoning. He pronounced
204. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (observing that “neighborhoods choose
people”).
205. See Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1373 (2014) (hereinafter
“Agglomerama”).
206. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 271 (8th ed. 1920) (noting
“[w]hen an industry has . . . chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long: so great
are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from near
neighbourhood to one another.”).
207. Agglomerama, supra note 205, at 1374-75 (internal citations omitted).
208. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
209. David S. Schoenbrod, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418, 1421 (1969).
210. Id. at 1418.
211. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building
of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether a
particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined . . . by considering it in
connection with the circumstances and the locality.212

The trial judge whose decision was reversed was more blunt as to the
municipality’s intent: “The purpose to be accomplished is really to regulate
the mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it. In the last
analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and
segregate them according to their income or situation in life.”213
Indeed, municipal explanations for zoning as necessary to “preserve the
character of the neighborhood” may well be “a code for the desire to
preserve economic, ethnic and racial homogeneity.”214 Nevertheless, in
light of the difficulty of implementing fair housing requirements under
federal law,215 efforts to resist invidious discrimination thus far have been
left largely to individual states.216
1.

Affordable Housing Fair Share Mandates

An early embodiment of affirmatively furthering affordable housing was
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Mount Laurel doctrine,217 which was
decreed exclusively under state law.218 Mount Laurel I was premised on
the state’s zoning powers being legitimately invoked only if consistent with
the state’s general welfare. The court held housing to be a fundamental
right and required every developing municipality to provide a “realistic
opportunity” for a fair share of its region’s affordable housing needs. In
the subsequent absence of progress by Mount Laurel and other New Jersey
municipalities in implementing those principles, Mount Laurel II provided
much more detailed requirements. The Mount Laurel mandates were made

212. Id. at 387.
213. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 277
U.S. 365 (1926).
214. STEPHEN R. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 164 (1978).
215. See infra notes 278-87 and accompanying text.
216. The federal role likely will become much greater in coming years, in light of Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S.
Ct. 2507 (2015), and the new HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,”
80 FR 42, 272 (July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 92, et al.). See infra Sections
II.E.3 and II.E.4 for discussion.
217. Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Twp., 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) [hereinafter Mount
Laurel III]; S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II]; S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I].
218. This treatment is a basic sketch. For more detail, see Robert C. Holmes, The Clash
of Home Rule and Affordable Housing: The Mount Laurel Story Continues, 12 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 325, 340–48 (2013); John M. Payne, Fairly Sharing Affordable Housing
Obligations: The Mount Laurel Matrix, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 365 (2001).
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applicable to all municipalities, with three judges to be designated to
develop a methodology for assigning numerical requirements for every
locality and to hear all Mount Laurel cases and a “builders remedy” put in
place so that a plaintiff’s parcel would enjoy the fruits of Mount Laurel
rezoning rather than the local legislature rezoning land belonging to
someone else.219 Mount Laurel III ratified a political compromise with the
Legislature, whereby Mount Laurel enforcement would be transferred to a
new administrative Council on Affordable Housing (“COAH”).220
In 2015, in Mount Laurel IV,221 the court noted that COAH’s rules
governing municipal housing obligations expired in 1999, that the agency
had failed to promulgate updated rules, and that the futility of seeking
administrative relief justified immediate access to the courts. In 2017, the
court declared that “[f]or the last sixteen years, while [COAH] failed to
promulgate viable rules creating a realistic opportunity for the construction
of low- and moderate-income housing in municipalities, the Mount Laurel
constitutional affordable housing obligation” did not go away.222 It held
that “under the current circumstances, the present-need analysis must be
expanded to guarantee municipal compliance with the Mount Laurel
doctrine.”223
In words both celebratory and wistful, Robert Holmes, who was wellsteeped in the process, wrote that the Mount Laurel doctrine “is among the
most significant contributions ever made to the advancement of affordable
housing . . . . In effect, the court went beyond what any state or federal
court had done prior to 1975 or has done since.”224
Some other states have cited the Mount Laurel doctrine in cases or in
developing statutes discouraging exclusionary zoning. In New Hampshire,
the Supreme Court adopted a less stringent version of the builders remedy
but not numerical quotas.225 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted from
the requirement in Mount Laurel I that an ordinance could not
presumptively foreclose the possibility of affordable housing in holding

219. S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
220. Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Twp., 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
221. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 ex rel. New Jersey Council on Affordable
Hous., 110 A.3d 31 (N.J. 2015) [hereinafter Mount Laurel IV].
222. In Re Declaratory Judgment Actions Filed By Various Municipalities, County of
Ocean, Pursuant to the Supreme Court's Decision in In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 221
N.J. 1 (2015), ___ A.3d ____, 2017 WL 192895, at *1 (N.J. Jan. 18, 2017) at *1.
223. Id.
224. Holmes, op. cit. at 325-26. Before beginning as a clinical professor at Rutgers
School of Law-Newark, Holmes was as assistant commissioner, N.J. Department of
Community Affairs; member of the inaugural N.J. State Planning Commission; and member
of the drafting task for the N.J. Fair Housing Act.
225. Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991).
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that a township ordinance limiting apartments to eighty of the community’s
11,598 acres is exclusionary.226 Massachusetts and Connecticut do not
emphasize planning for affordable housing but, rather, make available a
builders remedy where less than ten percent of the housing stock is
available to households with eighty percent of the area median income,
with appeals from negative decisions subject to review under favorable
presumptions.227
California law requires that the state and local governments “have a
responsibility . . . to facilitate the improvement and development of
housing to make adequate provision for the housing needs of all economic
segments of the community.”228 Required plans “shall make adequate
provision for the existing and projected needs of all economic segments of
the community.”229 The California provisions are a complex and top-down
array of nested plans and requirements.230 California’s fair share laws have
been described as “a useful foundation, [but] certainly only one piece of the
puzzle, but in that piece they are not totally useless.”231
2.

Inclusionary Zoning

Another device for fixing the affordable housing problem is
“inclusionary zoning.” Through one device or another, such as density
bonuses, fast-track project approvals, or government mandates, developers
are induced to provide housing at below-market prices. “Density bonuses”
means that developers who construct affordable units, i.e., units for sale or
rent at below-market rates to government-approved individuals, may
construct more units than the underlying zoning otherwise would permit.
Courts have deemed such programs to be valid land-use regulations.232

226. Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975).
227. See generally Thomas Silverstein, State Land Use Regulation in the Era of
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 24 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 305, 321
(2015); Melinda Westbrook, 66 CONN. B.J. 169 (1992) (detailing land use appeals
procedures).
228. Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 65580 (West 2016).
229. Id. § 65583.
230. Jessie Agatstein, The Suburbs’ Fair Share: How California’s Housing Element Law
(and Facebook) Can Set A Housing Production Floor, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 219, 226 (2015).
231. Id. at 270.
232. See Home Builders Ass’n. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001);
Holmdel Builders Assoc. v. Twp. of Holmdel, 556 A.2d 1236 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington
Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983);
Fairfax County v. DeGroff Enters., 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973).
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However, in his influential article The Irony of ‘Inclusionary’ Zoning,233
Robert Ellickson, described over thirty years ago why inclusionary
programs are so problematic.
These programs are essentially taxes on the production of new housing.
The programs will usually increase general housing prices, a result which
further limits the housing opportunities of moderate-income families. In
short, despite the assertions of inclusionary zoning proponents, most
inclusionary ordinances are just another form of exclusionary practice.234

Ellickson’s insight has its critics. For instance, Barbara Ehrlich Kautz
claims that Ellickson wrongfully asserted that “costs might be borne by
other homebuyers or renters, the developer, or the landowner,” since
programs could be designed that would create no additional costs for
anyone; communities could provide density bonuses large enough to cover
the entire cost of the inclusionary units.235 But unless one engages in
magical thinking, these bonuses are “provided” by the community only as
the direct result of restrictions imposed on existing owners in areas targeted
for more intense development.
As such, the regulations provide
governments with a strong incentive to overregulate so that they could
subsequently and selectively relax the regulations to their benefit, and
might constitute takings.236 Also, overregulation could have been used to
achieve some other government purpose. Again, the cost of a “free” choice
is what someone must forego in order that it be provided.237
3.

Rent Control

Rent control “historically has been among the most important
interventions in housing markets.”238 It is a traditional, albeit controversial,
way of providing affordable housing to sitting tenants and likely their
successors.239 However, it has long been a truism among economists,

233. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of ‘Inclusionary’ Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167
(1981).
234. Id. at 1170.
235. Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating
Affordable Housing, 36 U. S.F. L. REV. 971, 984-85 (2002).
236. Steven J. Eagle, The Perils of Regulatory Property in Land Use Litigation, 54
Washburn L. J. 1 (2014).
237. See infra Section I.B.
238. EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY:
HOW TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 58 (2008).
239. Compare Curtis J. Berger, Home Is Where the Heart Is: A Brief Reply to Professor
Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (1989) (“Rent control, in New York City and
elsewhere, makes it possible for tenants to regard their apartment as a home, and to think of
themselves as belonging to a community.”), with Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the
Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 744 (1988) (“Rent control statutes
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regardless of their political views, that “[a] ceiling on rents reduces the
quantity and quality of housing” overall.240 Nevertheless skyrocketing
rents facing tenants in California now militate toward the largest expansion
in rent controls in decades.241 To the extent that such measures become
law, they will surely benefit current tenants and provide some positive
spillovers. More importantly, however, they will further discourage the
construction of rental housing and decrease housing affordability for all
except entrenched and lucky renters.
4.

Affirmative Use of Eminent Domain

In Kelo v. City of New London, the U.S. Supreme Court broadly
interpreted government’s power of eminent domain to encompass takings
for public benefit, as well as public use.242 Kelo continues to be regarded
by many as impermissibly intruding on private property rights,243 and many
states have imposed significant limitations on its use.244
In addition to other concerns, the use of eminent domain has a
disreputable past with regard to affordable housing and racial justice. In
Berman v. Parker,245 Justice Douglas declared for the Court that the use of
eminent domain for the demolition of an entire neighborhood was
warranted so that the area would not “revert again to a blighted or slum
area, as though possessed of a congenital disease.”246 Responding to the
“disease” metaphor, Professor Wendell Pritchett described how “blight”
became regarded as a “public menace,” justifying the demolition of
minority neighborhoods near the urban core and their replacement by

operate to take part of the landlord’s interest in his reversion and to transfer it to the
tenant.”).
240. Bruno S. Frey et al., Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical
Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 986, 988, 991 (1984) (fewer than two percent of U.S.
economists in a random survey disagreed).
241. See Conor Dougherty, In Silicon Valley Suburbs, Calls to Limit the Soaring Rents,
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1Oin1uE [https://perma.cc/Y3MM-6CDB].
“After years of punishing rent increases, activists across Silicon Valley and the San
Francisco Bay Area are pushing a spate of rent control proposals, driven by outrage over
soaring housing prices and fears that the growing income gap is turning middle-class
families into an endangered species. Those campaigns, if successful, would lead to the
largest expansion of tenant laws since the 1970s.” Id.
242. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
243. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad
Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201 (2006) (setting forth jurisprudential and practical objections).
244. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (enumerating individual state responses).
245. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
246. Id. at 34.
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upscale housing and shops.247 Quoting Pritchett in his dissent in Kelo,
Justice Thomas noted that “[u]rban renewal projects have long been
associated with the displacement of blacks; [i]n cities across the country,
urban renewal came to be known as ‘Negro removal.’”248
A different, affirmative, use of eminent domain was suggested by
Professors Carol Necole Brown and Serena Williams in connection with
the rebuilding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.249 They argued that
the creation of affordable housing through the use of eminent domain in
conjunction with tax subsidies would prevent the creation of “affluent
segregated neighborhoods” and preserve the “cultural complexity” that has
marked the city.250 While eminent domain might be useful in other
affordable housing situations, Professor John Lovett later noted that it has
not been necessary in New Orleans.251
5.

Is Compelled Inclusionary Zoning a “Taking?”

In California Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose
(“CBIA”),252 the California Supreme Court held in 2015 that a requirement
that a developer sell fifteen percent of its on-site for-sale units at an
affordable housing price was not an unconstitutional exaction violative of
the takings clause and that this result was not dependent upon a showing
that the affordable housing shortage that the ordinance was attempting to
ameliorate was related to the development for which a permit was sought.
Prior to Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,253 the city’s
demand might be shrugged off as yet one more example of a type of
incentive zoning or, more bluntly, “zoning for dollars.”254

247. Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003).
248. 545 U.S. 469, 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Pritchett, op. cit., at 47).
249. Carol Necole Brown & Serena M. Williams, The Houses That Eminent Domain and
Housing Tax Credits Built: Imaging a Better New Orleans, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 689
(2007).
250. Id. at 718-19.
251. John A. Lovett, Tragedy or Triumph in Post-Katrina New Orleans? Reflections on
Possession, Dispossession, Demographic Change and Affordable Housing, 40 FORDHAM
URB, L.J. CITY SQUARE 22, 24-25 (2013) (explaining that mixed income housing developers
found many well-situated large parcels otherwise available, and that the local development
agency had access to thousands of smaller parcels throughout the city, obtained from
departed residents who accepted a state buy-out offer).
252. 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
253. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
254. See generally Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game?
Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991) (describing bargaining for the relaxation of zoning requirements in
exchange for developer payment of fees to fund various community needs and amenities).
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In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,255 the Commission had
conditioned a development approval for the enlargement of a beachfront
home on the applicants’ granting a public easement of way along the dry
sand behind the home. The U.S. Supreme Court held that this demand
would constitute an unconstitutional condition since no “essential nexus”
existed between it and the Commission’s regulatory power to preserve the
view of the ocean from the highway in front of the house. In Dolan v. City
of Tigard,256 where there was such a nexus, the Court further held that
conditioning a development approval upon an exaction was permissible
only where there was “rough proportionality” between it and the police
power burden resulting from the development, as ascertained through an
“individualized determination.”257 The Court extended the Nollan-Dolan
principle in 2013, in Koontz.258 There, the Court held it applicable to
exactions of cash as well as real property, and that the denial of a
development permit because the landowner refused to accept the condition
could “impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without
just compensation.”259
The California Supreme Court in CBIA distinguished Koontz by
declaring the requirement that fifteen percent of units be sold at belowmarket rate for affordable housing “does not require the developer to
dedicate any portion of its property to the public or to pay any money to the
public.”260 Rather, it “simply places a restriction on the way the developer
may use its property by limiting the price for which the developer may
offer some of its units for sale.”261 This reasoning, premised on the fact that
developers can refrain from selling or renting units in residential
subdivisions, seems inconsistent with recent U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. In Horne v. Department of Agriculture,262 the Court held that
the right to sell a legal product (there, raisins for table use) might be
regulated, but is “not a special government benefit that the Government
may hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of constitutional
protection.”263 Horne extended to personal property the Court’s earlier
declaration in Nollan that “the right to build on one’s own property—even

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
512 U.S. 374, 414 (1994).
Id. at 391.
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
Id. at 2596.
351 P.3d 974, 991 (Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
Id.
135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015)
Id. at 2430-31.
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though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting
requirements—cannot remotely be described as a ‘government benefit.’”264
Furthermore, the permit condition does require the developer to sell
housing to a government designee at below-the-market price. This
functionally is no different than a mandatory bargain-sale to the
government, with subsequent resale to the affordable housing buyer. While
the Supreme Court has not decided any exaction cases subsequent to
Koontz, the issue posed by CBIA will continue to be pressed before it.
D.

Legislation Through Complex and Opaque Public-Private
Bargains

One way to develop comparative less expensive housing is through
various public-private development schemes.
The notion is that
government will guide the development so that it serves a public purpose
and that private enterprise will provide the capital and expertise. As the
popular metaphor has it, public agencies will steer and private actors will
row.265
However, the public sector often pays inadequate attention to the costs
of managing outside contractors.266
More disturbingly, the very
information government needs to plan effectively often is in the hands of
discerning developers who want to ensure profit from the government’s
choice as the price of disclosure.267
Given the general unwillingness of the public to pay for affordable
housing or to suffer increased densification that would result from
additional housing, various ways have been suggested for “grand bargains”
and “citywide deals that promote housing.”268 However, as I have
elaborated upon elsewhere,269 “grand bargains” often entrench the fruits of
logrolling and crony capitalism in the form of property rights. They also
do not facilitate most effective land use, since developers still have strong

264. Id. at 2430 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2).
265. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 30 (1992) (“As they
unhook themselves from the tax-and-service wagon, [political leaders] have learned that
they can steer more effectively if they let others do more of the rowing. Steering is very
difficult if an organization’s best energies and brains are devoted to rowing.”).
266. Jonas Prager, Contracting Out Government Services: Lessons From the Private
Sector, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 176 (1994).
267. See Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and Public
Benefit in an Era of Agglomeration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1078-79 (2011).
268. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 136, at 111-16.
269. Steven J. Eagle, On Engineering Urban Densification, 4 PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 73
(2015).
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incentives to build projects most profitable instead of most responsive to
community need.270
E.

Federal Subsidies and HUD Mandates

Other ways to provide more affordable housing are based on federal
subsidies and Department of Housing and Urban Development mandates.
According to a 2015 Congressional Budget Office report,271 the previous
year the federal government provided about fifty billion dollars in spending
and tax subsidies that was specifically designated as housing assistance for
low-income households.272 That assistance (as measured in 2014 dollars)
increased by about fifteen percent between 2000 and 2003, but has
“remained relatively stable” thereafter.273 Furthermore, unlike meanstested programs like food stamps, which are intended to assist all eligible
individuals, only a quarter of the twenty million eligible households receive
federal housing assistance.274 As a result of lack of horizontal equity
between those who benefit from housing assistance and those who do not,
“some have likened it to a lottery.”275
1.

Federal Subsidy Programs

The Congressional Budget Office’s 2015 report briefly discussed the
federal housing subsidy programs for low-income housing.276 A classic
way to provide for new urban development is through TIF, which utilizes
federally tax-subsidized bonds and which is politically attractive because it
brings money to cities without the need for local taxation.277 Under TIF,
the bonds are issued to build projects, and the bonds are paid through
diversion of the incremental real estate tax revenues resulting from the
higher property valuations generated by the new construction. However,
there are considerable problems with TIF. One is that local officials and
developers seek “the blight that’s right”—areas bad enough to be approved
for tax subsidies but good enough so that even non-subsidized private

270. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
271. CONGR. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS (Sept. 2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-20152016/reports/50782-LowIncomeHousing-OneColumn.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNH5-G67M].
272. Id. at 1.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 10.
275. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?, 60
U. CHI. L. REV. 497, 539 (1993).
276. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 271.
277. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 73 (2010).
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projects might be sustainable.278 Another problem is that the “incremental”
tax revenues syphoned off to repay the bonds are vitally needed for local
public services, such as education, police, and fire protection.
Another subsidy for development of affordable housing is the federal
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”).279 The LIHTC has been
called “the largest and most important federal housing program in the
United States . . . with a size and scale comparable to public housing and
the federal Section 8 program.”280
A recent study in Philadelphia found that “LIHTC-funded developments
are more likely to be built in gentrifying neighborhoods because developers
have strong market incentives to, and may be more likely to receive
LIHTCs if they target gentrifying neighborhoods.”281 The author suggested
that “building these developments in poor, non-gentrifying neighborhoods
seems to be a more efficient use of government resources.”282
One of the most expensive government subsidies for housing283 is the
income tax mortgage interest deduction (“MID”) for interest payments on
up to one million dollars million in primary or second-home mortgage
debt.284 Professor Mechele Dickerson accurately noted that the MID
“gives higher-income taxpayers an incentive to buy expensive homes, but
is of little use to lower- or middle-income renters.”285 She also recognized,
however, that public support for the MID, together with lobbying by
interest groups such as homebuilders and lenders, makes change politically
untenable.286 More than that, the advantage of government subsidies and
other regulatory advantages attached to specific assets immediately is
capitalized into the value of those assets.287 Intense political opposition to
substantial tampering with the MID will come from owners of existing

278. George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right for California Redevelopment Law,
52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1004-05. (2001).
279. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012).
280. Kristin Niver, Changing the Face of Urban America: Assessing the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 49 (2016).
281. Benjamin Field, Why Low-Income Housing Tax Credits Are Flowing to Gentrifying
Neighborhoods (Apr. 23, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2778182 [https://perma.cc/7BGPUQED].
282. Id.
283. See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017 (2013) (noting that the deduction costs the
federal government in excess of seventy billion dollars annually).
284. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C) (2012).
285. A. Mechele Dickerson, Millennials, Affordable Housing, and the Future of
Homeownership, 24 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 435, 460 (2016).
286. Id.
287. See generally Gordon Tullock, The Transitional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. ECON. 671
(1975).
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homes who paid their sellers a higher price in order to reap the advantage
of future income tax deductions and stand to lose considerable sums if they
could not pass the same advantage to their own purchasers.
2.

Proposed HUD Rule on Housing Choice Vouchers

The Federal Housing Choice Voucher program (also known as Section 8
housing),288 assists eligible low- and moderate-income families obtain
housing through HUD subsidies to private landlords. HUD recently
proposed rulemaking that would permit custom tailoring of maximum
permissible rents to small neighborhoods.289
Rather than determine rents on the basis of an entire metropolitan area,
this rule proposes to determine rents on the basis of ZIP codes. ZIP codes
are small enough to reflect neighborhood differences and provide an
easier method of comparing rents within one ZIP code to another ZIP
code area within a metropolitan area . . . HUD believes that Small Area
FMRs [Fair Market Rents] are more effective in helping families move to
areas of higher opportunity and lower poverty.290

One public housing authority that was authorized to experiment with the
plan, the Chicago Housing Authority (“CHA”), selected “four lucky
residents” to reside in a high-rise on North Lake Shore Drive that is “the
second-most expensive in the city, with rents for a one-bedroom apartment
approaching $3,000 a month, well beyond the reach of most Chicago
residents.”291 The CHA’s intent was to “expand its housing voucher
program so that more low-income residents can leave the city’s roughest
neighborhoods and start a new life in places with low poverty and crime
and close to good schools and jobs.”292
Some landlords maintain it is a mistake to use scarce tax dollars to pay
ultra-high rents for a fortunate few when more than 15,000 people sit on
the CHA’s voucher waiting list.293 One added: “In a situation where you’re

288. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 982 (2015).
289. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area Fair
Market Rents in Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50th Percentile
FMRs, 81 Fed. Reg. 39,218 (June 8, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983,
and 985).
290. Id. at 39,219.
291. Alby Gallun, Poor Families Use ‘Supervouchers’ to Rent in City’s Priciest
Buildings, CHI. BUS. J. (July 26, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140726/
ISSUE01/307269984/poor-families-use-supervouchers-to-rent-in-citys-priciest-buildings
[https://perma.cc/X4R8-T65U].
292. Id.
293. Id.
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dealing with a low-income person, do they really need a 25th-floor
apartment with a lake view? It just doesn’t make sense to me.”294
The new HUD and Chicago approach raises a number of issues,
including the debate between the “traditional” and “opportunities access”
models of integration295 and concerns that government subsidies ought not
to be used to leapfrog benefit recipients over moderate- and middle-income
taxpayers.296
3.

Disparate Impact and Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing

While the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) addressed the denial of housing
opportunities on the basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin,”297
“by the late 1970s, it was clear the FHA had the potential to serve as a tool
for remedying exclusionary zoning, but the constraints of standing doctrine
and the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent through circumstantial
evidence somewhat curtailed the effectiveness of that tool.”298 Professor
David Troutt argued that the FHA is the “least successful of the civil rights
acts.”299 While it envisioned that “[o]vercoming discrimination that denied
protected classes residency in high-opportunity areas would produce
integrated communities of more equal opportunity, the problem has been
that discrimination has matured in less recognizable ways and segregation
has calcified, leading to more concentrated poverty, re-segregation and
widening economic inequality.”300
The notion that “discrimination has matured in less recognizable ways”
undergirded the Supreme Court’s five to four decision in Texas Department
of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project.301
The ICP, a nonprofit corporation facilitating affordable housing, alleged
that the Department had allocated too many federal low-income tax credits
for construction of low-income housing in predominantly minority inner
city areas and too few in predominantly white suburbs.302 Texas asserted
that the appropriate standard of review was “disparate treatment,” whereas
IPC asserted it was “disparate impact.” “In contrast to a disparatetreatment case, where a ‘plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a

294. Id. (quoting landlord Tony Rossi, president of a Chicago-based management
company).
295. See discussion supra Section II.B.5.
296. See infra note 361 and accompanying text.
297. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-06 (2012).
298. Silverstein, supra note 227, at 315.
299. David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65
BUFF. L. REV. 5 (2017).
300. Id.
301. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
302. See id. at 2514.
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discriminatory intent or motive,’ a plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact
claim challenges practices that have a ‘disproportionately adverse effect on
minorities’ and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.”303 The
district court had concluded that ICP had established a prima facie case of
disparate impact.304
In holding that disparate-impact claims were cognizable under the Fair
Housing Act, Justice Kennedy stressed America’s history of segregated
housing,305 that Congress was aware when it amended the FHA in 1988
that the nine Courts of Appeals to have considered disparate-impact claims
unanimously held them cognizable by the courts306 and that recognition of
disparate-impact claims was “consistent with the FHA’s central purpose
[to] eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s
economy.”307
However, Justice Kennedy stressed it would raise “serious constitutional
questions” if disparate-impact liability could be “imposed based solely on a
showing of a statistical disparity.”308 Noting the principal dissent by
Justice Alito, he added that the “limitations on disparate-impact liability
discussed here are also necessary to protect potential defendants against
abusive disparate-impact claims.”309 These qualifications have been
described as “promulgat[ing] terms for a peace settlement between
disparate impact and equal protection.”310 The nuances in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion suggest that applying the disparate-impact standard
might not be without difficulty.311

303. Id. at 2513 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
304. Id. at 2514 (noting, inter alia, that over 92% of credits in Dallas were allocated to
census tracts with less than 50% Caucasian residents, and that 49.7% of units were approved
for areas with less than 10% Caucasians, but only 37.4% approval in areas with at least 90%
Caucasians).
305. See id. at 2515-16 (noting, inter alia, that de jure residential segregation was
declared unconstitutional almost a century ago, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917),
“but its vestiges remain today, intertwined with the country’s economic and social life.”).
306. See id. at 2519-20.
307. Id. at 2521.
308. Id. at 2522.
309. Id. at 2524 (joining in Justice Alito’s dissent were Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and
Thomas, JJ.).
310. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and
Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
1115, 1117 (2016).
311. See discussion infra Section II.E.4.
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Three weeks after Inclusive Communities was handed down, HUD
promulgated its rules on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing
(“AFFH”).312 These rules included an affordable housing component.
HUD’s rule recognizes the role of place-based strategies, including
economic development to improve conditions in high poverty
neighborhoods, as well as preservation of the existing affordable housing
stock, including HUD-assisted housing, to help respond to the
overwhelming need for affordable housing.

***
A balanced approach would include, as appropriate, the removal of
barriers that prevent people from accessing housing in areas of
opportunity, the development of affordable housing in such areas . . . 313

Pursuant to the AFFH final rules, jurisdictions receiving HUD funding
will be provided with data and tools for conducting the analysis of fair
housing issues specific to their area and are asked by HUD to assess their
performance and devise goals based on data and analysis.314 Metrics and
technics for doing so are now being developed and assessed.315
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases raising
the issue of whether a city alleging that it has suffered consequential
damages has standing to allege discriminatory practices under the Fair
Housing Act.316

312. See generally HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.).
313. Id. at 80 FR 42,279.
314. AFFH defines a “fair housing issue” as “a condition in a program participant’s
geographic area of analysis that restricts fair housing choice or access to opportunity, and
includes such conditions as ongoing local or regional segregation or lack of integration,
racially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, significant disparities in access to
opportunity, disproportionate housing needs, and evidence of discrimination or violations of
civil rights law or regulations related to housing.” 24 C.F.R. § 5.152.
315. See generally Mindy Kao & Dan Immergluck, AFFH Metrics for Affordable
Housing Programs: An Approach to Assessing the Spatial Distribution of Housing Subsidies
in Large Jurisdictions in the Assessment of Fair Housing (May 25, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2784583 [https://perma.cc/9AQL-3MWA].
316. See Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 136 S. Ct. 2544, No. 15-1111,
granting cert. (June 28, 2016); Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of Miami, 136 S. Ct. 2545, No.
15-1112, granting cert. (June 28, 2016). The City sued the petitioners, claiming that their
predatory loans, and refusal to extend credit to minorities on equal terms, violated the FHA
because they were intentionally discriminatory and had a disparate impact on minorities. It
asserted that this conduct led to a higher foreclosure rate, depressed property values, and
that, as a consequence, the City suffered a loss of real estate tax revenue.
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Affordable Housing Mandates Will be Difficult to Apply and Enforce

It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a detailed analysis of the
substantial volume of litigation culminating in Inclusive Communities,317
the HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,”318 and
the administrative interpretations and cases that surely will follow.
However, a few cautions are in order.
Fair housing advocate Thomas Silverstein reviewed attempts in recent
decades to reverse land-use regulations leading to exclusionary housing and
noted that none “have fundamentally reshaped how people in communities
on the ground think about land-use regulation. As evidenced by the
rhetoric of [some] local policy-makers . . . many continue to see
exclusionary zoning as something that is natural, inevitably local, and
supportive of individual property rights.”319 He added that the New Jersey
Fair Housing Act is “in some ways the gold standard for state law
innovations,” but “that system was the result of and continues to be fraught
with litigation.”320 “That conflict is both a reflection of its effectiveness,
which has riled exclusionary suburbs, and its complexity, which has even
baffled supporters at times.”321
Another advocate, Professor Tim Iglesias, added:
Sometimes we yearn for affordable housing and fair housing to be frontburner issues, but as the old saying goes: “be careful what you wish for.”
In my view, we are not a “post-racial society” in any meaningful sense.
Race, income, and integration are still difficult and volatile topics among
legislators, opinion leaders, and among the general public. Increased
proposed use of inclusionary zoning is likely to incite a controversial
public debate about “forced integration.” If we are not ready for this
debate, it could hurt both affordable housing and fair housing in general
as well as increase local opposition to inclusionary zoning ordinances. In
particular, if the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (“AFFH”)
regulation is finalized, we should expect much more critical attention to
integration.322

317. See Texas Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
318. See 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015).
319. Silverstein, supra note 227, at 328.
320. Id. at 317 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301-329.9 and, inter alia, In re the
Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 110 A.3d 31
(N.J. 2015)).
321. Id. at 317
322. Iglesias, supra note 1, at 593.
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Although the “regnant scholarly consensus” is that the Fair Housing Act
is “tepid, toothless, and ineffective,”323 Professor Jonathan Zasloff asserted
that during its first decade strong enforcement by the Department of
Justice, especially with respect to realtors, brought about significant
success.324 It is instructive to recall that HUD Secretary George Romney,
formerly a moderate Republican governor of Michigan, was a supporter of
fair housing, but his attempts to use subsidized housing programs to
promote housing integration in the suburbs were not in line with Nixon
Administration policy and he was forced out of office.325 Significantly,
“[t]here is little evidence that top Nixon officials encouraged fair housing
enforcement, but they basically left the Civil Rights Division alone.”326
It seems clear that implementing Inclusive Communities and the HUD
AFFH regulations will take a considerable and sustained effort by the
Department of Justice, HUD, and other federal agencies. Much will
depend on whether President Trump and his administration would be
desirous of pursuing those goals.
Testimony at Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ confirmation hearings was
sharply divided regarding his commitment to civil rights.327 Likewise,
when HUD Secretary Ben Carson was a presidential candidate at the time
Inclusive Communities was handed down and HUD issued its AFFH final
regulations, he spoke of those developments disapprovingly:
Remember busing, that brilliant social experiment that was to usher in a
new era of racial utopia in America? Undaunted by the failed socialist
experiments of the 1980s, the Obama administration has recently
implemented a new Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) rule designed to “desegregate” housing by withholding funds from
communities that fail to demonstrate their projects “affirmatively further”
fair housing.”328

Dr. Carson further asserted:

323. Jonathan Zasloff, Between Resistance and Embrace: American Realtors, the Justice
Department, and the Uncertain Triumph of the Fair Housing Act, 1968-1978, 60 HOW. L.J.
(forthcoming 2017) (UCLA School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series Research Paper No. 17-08), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909872 [https://perma.cc/
75ZV-8REH].
324. Id. at *10-11.
325. See CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960:
PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 163-64 (2005).
326. See Zasloff, supra note 323, at *12.
327. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo & Eric Lichtbau, Black Leaders Put Race Front and Center at
Confirmation Hearing for Sessions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2017, at A25.
328. Ben S. Carson, Experimenting With Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July 23,
2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housingrules-try-to-accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/KJ3C-49QT].
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These government-engineered attempts to legislate racial equality create
consequences that often make matters worse. There are reasonable ways
to use housing policy to enhance the opportunities available to lowerincome citizens, but based on the history of failed socialist experiments in
this country, entrusting the government to get it right can prove downright
dangerous.329

Federal judges, too, will have a substantial role in shaping the outcome
of affirmatively furthering fair housing efforts. Even under a “disparate
treatment” analysis, subtle and contestable judgments will be required.
Inclusive Communities cautioned:
Disparate-impact liability mandates the “removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers,” not the displacement of valid governmental
policies. The FHA is not an instrument to force housing authorities to
reorder their priorities. Rather, the FHA aims to ensure that those
priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory
effects or perpetuating segregation.330

Inclusive Communities added that “[a]n important and appropriate means
of ensuring that disparate-impact liability is properly limited is to give
housing authorities and private developers leeway to state and explain the
valid interest served by their policies.”331
Balancing the various goals of the FHA against other important local
needs necessarily implicates federal executive and judicial review of local
land-use determinations. Historically, the federal government has not
generally intruded on local land-use decisions.332 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit opined that federal courts are not the “grand
The Fourth Circuit likewise pronounced,
mufti” of land use.333
“[r]esolving the routine land-use disputes that inevitably and constantly
arise among developers, local residents, and municipal officials is simply
not the business of the federal courts . . . .”334

329. Id.
330. Texas Dept. of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
331. Id. at 2522.
332. See Jerold S. Kayden, National Land-Use Planning in America: Something Whose
Time Has Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 445. “The reasons for this absence stem
from a country-specific blend of constitutional, historical, cultural, and economic
ingredients that together favor local land-use planning and regulation over higher level
exercises.” Id. at 446.
333. See Hoehne v. Cty. of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the
Supreme Court has erected procedural barriers “to guard against the federal courts becoming
the Grand Mufti of local zoning boards.”). See generally Steven J. Eagle, Penn Central and
Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (2014).
334. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cty., 48 F.3d 810, 828 (4th Cir. 1995).
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The Trump administration is likely to appoint a record number of federal
judges.335 It is reasonable to speculate that they would not be inclined
towards a broad view of federal land use regulatory powers. It is
instructive in this regard to consider the 2016 Republican Platform:
Zoning decisions have always been, and must remain, under local control.
The current Administration is trying to seize control of the zoning process
through its Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing regulation. It threatens
to undermine zoning laws in order to socially engineer every community
in the country. While the federal government has a legitimate role in
enforcing nondiscrimination laws, this regulation has nothing to do with
proven or alleged discrimination and everything to do with hostility to the
self-government of citizens.336

Although the Supreme Court has stated that the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause337 is not a “poor relation” to other constitutional rights,338
the Court has set its protections at a fairly low level with regard to alleged
“regulatory takings” that result from stringent regulations.339 Even then, a
practical caveat is in order. Professors James Krier and Stewart Sterk
recently noted that the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence is a “body of
doctrine [that] sets a constitutional bottom.”340
States must protect property at least as much as the Court’s rules decree,
but they are free in principle to protect it more. Moreover, state courts

335. See, e.g., Philip Rucker & Robert Barnes, Trump to Inherit More Than 100 Court
Vacancies, Plans to Reshape Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-inherit-more-than-100-court-vacancies-plans-to-reshapejudiciary/2016/12/25/d190dd18-c928-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/YWC7-736A].
336. Republican Platform 2016 at 4 (2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/
documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5b1%5d-ben_1468872234.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JVH27HGD].
337. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” The Takings Clause applies to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897).
338. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (“We see no reason why the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in
these comparable circumstances.”).
339. Takings liability generally is premised on a multifactor, ad hoc, test stressing
economic impact on the claimant, investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
regulation. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The
Court of Federal Claims has indicated that a diminution in value as a result of a regulation
“approaching 85 to 90 percent” would “not necessarily dictate the existence of a taking.”
Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271 (Fed. Cl. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
340. James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 35 (2016), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol58/iss1/3/
[https://perma.cc/W66D-AMGT].
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are able, in practice, to protect it less, because the Supreme Court has
developed ripeness and preclusion rules that limit the ability of lower
federal courts to oversee their work, and because the Court can review
only a fraction of takings cases in any event.341

Those “ripeness and preclusion” rules342 apply only to takings and
closely related substantive due process claims343 and not to “constitutional
torts” related to free speech, racial and religious discrimination, and other
constitutionally protected rights.344
In a somewhat analogous situation, a clear federal policy regarding local
land-use decisions was enunciated in the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUPIA”).345 Courts are required to apply
strict scrutiny in reviewing local land-use decisions that arguably impose a
substantial burden on religious exercise if those decisions involve
“individualized assessments” of the proposed use of the parcel.346 While
alleged discrimination against religious uses of land always has been
susceptible to attack under the Free Exercise347 and Equal Protection
Clauses,348 some supporters of RLUPIA grounded it in claims that the
underlying nature of land-use regulation lacks objective standards, and
granting local officials with “virtually unlimited discretion” thus “readily
lends itself to religious discrimination.”349

341. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
342. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)
(holding full faith and credit statute to preclude further litigation of issues adjudicated in
state courts, so that mandatory state “ripening” of federal takings claims in fact serves as
collateral estoppel barring the subsequent hearing of those claims in federal court);
Williamson Cty. Reg’l Plan. Com’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) (setting
forth “final determination” and “state litigation” prongs required before regulatory takings
claims are “ripe” for review in federal courts).
343. R.S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental Abstention Doctrine: After
Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings Claims to State Court Under
Williamson County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 568, 588-93 (2016).
344. See J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of Williamson County’s
Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41
URB. LAW. 615, 635 (2009) (“No Supreme Court precedent sanctions requiring state court
procedures to ripen a non-takings claim, and no precedent supports compressing all
property-related injuries into one takings claim.”).
345. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2012).
346. Id. at § 2000cc(a).
347. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
348. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
349. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from
RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 722 (2008) (citing HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. Rep. No. 106-219, at 18
(1999)).
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Unlike RLUPIA, neither Inclusive Communities350 nor HUD’s new
affirmative regulations351 purports to impose strict scrutiny.352 It is
possible, of course, that the executive branch and the courts will apply
affordable housing mandates zealously and might use RLUPIA as a model
in such efforts. It might be that the filing of a few highly publicized cases
and HUD withdrawals of housing funding would serve as a sufficient
incentive for localities to conform their conduct to advancing fair housing.
On the other hand, such actions might redouble the efforts of opponents
who see broad-based attempts to impose income and racial integration as
“social engineering.”353
Professor Lee Anne Fennell wrote that a driver of segregation has been
the desires and search patterns of homeseekers.354 This practice might
partially be thwarted through devices such as interactive search tools that
employ algorithms to provide home seekers with results from
neighborhoods similar to those they are searching, but in more integrated
neighborhoods.355
Fennell’s speculations seem to be an example of government “nudging”
of individuals, with the ambiguity associated with soft paternalism.356 But,
for proponents, this might be insufficient, and
nudges faced with firm opposition must be supported by a web of
regulation and government marketing so strong that the cost of cutting
through that web exceeds the benefits . . . . Changing the default is not
enough; regulation must also control the framing of the default and the
opt-out process.357

350. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015).
351. HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 80 Fed. Reg 42,272
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.).
352. See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text (discussing cautions against an overzealous approach in Inclusive Communities; HUD Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,272
(noting that HUD “does not mandate specific outcomes for the planning process[,]” but
rather, “recognizing the importance of local decisionmaking” helps HUD program
participants “to be better positioned to fulfill their obligation to affirmatively further fair
housing.”).
353. See Iglesias, supra note 1, at 593 & n.34 (noting Patrik Jonsson, ‘Fair’ Housing or
‘Social Engineering’? HUD Proposal Stirs Controversy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 9,
2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/0809/Fair-housing-or-social-engineeringHUD-proposal-stirs-controversy [https://perma.cc/FRJ3-36XG] (reporting fears that the
proposed AFFH rule would “force communities to diversify in ways that may hurt local
property values, their tax bases, and their overall economies”)).
354. Fennell, supra note 35.
355. Id. at 53-56.
356. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 39.
357. Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1229 (2013).
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In the somewhat unlikely event that the executive branch or the courts
opt for far-reaching change, they might adopt the advice of Professor Dan
Kahan, who suggested that enforcing statutory requirements in the face of
societal “sticky norms” to the contrary might best be done through the
imposition of only mild sanctions, at first, until public attitudes change.358
5.

Conflicting Value Systems and the Idea of “Fairness”

One fundamental source of social tension, as interpreted by the noted
sociologist Jonathan Haidt in The Righteous Mind,359 is that liberals and
conservatives have different moral “palates.” Liberals have two values,
“care” for the needs of others and “fairness” (defined as “equality”).
Conservatives are concerned equally with five values: “care,” “fairness”
(defined very differently, as people reaping what they sow), “loyalty,”
“authority,” and “sanctity.”360 Housing in good neighborhoods, then, is
either a right that all people should be able to enjoy (fairness as equality),
or, conversely, a reward for diligent effort (fairness as just deserts).
Howard Husock exemplifies the latter view in claiming that socioeconomic
status rightfully is the primary determinant of where people live.
[F]amilies strive, save and move up the steps of the economic ladder.
When they do, the symbol of their achievement, as well as its reward, is
the neighborhood or municipality in which they live.
Scattering subsidized housing breaks the unspoken rules of housing, and
thus inspires bitter opposition. Public housing built in affluent or bluecollar neighborhoods allows families (or individuals) who have not
followed the same route of upward mobility to share the reward. What is
undermined is a defining aspect of middle-class life: accepting the
discipline of work and family, as well as law and order, to attain, after a
time, comfortable and secure surroundings.361

Discussions of “equality” and “merit” often neglect, on one hand, the
problem of accounting for “work” in the “informal economy”362 and, on the
other, structural changes that make it difficult for children to rise above the
status of their parents.363
Professor George Wright asserted that “the most crucial Supreme Court
discussions on equal protection bear only modest indication, either direct or
358. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
359. HAIDT, supra note 18.
360. Id. at 155-86.
361. Howard Husock, The Folly of Public Housing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1993, at A18.
362. See Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1132-33 (2006) (noting
that for government benefits purposes “work often is casually equated with the production
of earned income or, even more narrowly, with full-time employment for wages.”).
363. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 201.
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indirect, explicit or implicit, and however diluted, of any of the leading
historic, traditional, or contemporary understandings of the idea of equality
itself.”364 It might be that litigation based on Inclusive Communities365 or
the HUD “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” regulations366 ultimately
will push the Supreme Court toward addressing that basic question.
F.

Reducing Government Barriers to New Market-Rate Housing

It is perhaps intrinsic to democracy that people demand goods despite
the fact that their demands are inconsistent. Also, existing voters are
advocates of what Richard Babcock referred to as “municipal
primogeniture,” the right of the first residents of a community to assert its
character by placing the burden of undesirable uses upon others.367 As
Washington Post housing reporter Emily Badger summed up:
San Francisco can have a dynamic economy and charming neighborhoods
unmarred by new construction and denser housing. But it can’t have both
of those things without paying a steep cost in rent (and without pushing
lower-wage workers out). Other cities face a similar fate if their
economies boom but their housing construction does not.368

In cities like San Francisco, amenity-based restrictions, such as historic
preservation, environmental preservation, and height ceilings “add up,
across a city, even if they’re well-intentioned. The affordability issue will
rear its head.”369 Likewise, mandates for strict urban growth containment,
as in Portland, Oregon “probably do[] cause higher housing prices.”370
Indeed, while the high tech boom often is blamed for the extraordinarily
high rents in San Francisco, in fact, rents have risen at a remarkably steady
6.6 percent per year since 1956, or 2.5% after inflation.371 The California
average home price of $440,000 is 2.5 times the national average of
364. R. George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 L. & INEQ. 1, 1
(2016).
365. Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S.
Ct. 2507 (2015).
366. HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.).
367. RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 150 (1966).
368. Emily Badger, What It Would Actually Take to Reduce Rents in America’s Most
Expensive City, WASH. POST (May 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2016/05/22/what-it-would-actually-take-to-reduce-rents-in-americas-mostexpensive-city/ [https://perma.cc/CP3R-PYV7].
369. See Thompson, supra note 116 (quoting UCLA economist Matthew Kahn).
370. William A. Fischel, Comment on Anthony Downs’s “Have Housing Prices Risen
Faster in Portland than Elsewhere?, 13 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 43, 44 (2002).
371. See Eric Fisher, Employment, Construction, and the Cost of San Francisco
Apartments, EXPERIMENTAL GEOGRAPHY (May 14, 2016), http://experimental-geography.
blogspot.com/ [https://perma.cc/9RRC-ZJ2J]. Fisher is a professor of economics at
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo.
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$180,000; the average monthly rent of $1240 is 50% higher than the rest of
the country ($840).372
Two leading land-use economists, Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko,
have concluded,
America does not uniformly face a housing affordability crisis. In the
majority of places, land costs are low (or at least reasonable) and housing
prices are close to (or below) the costs of new construction. In the places
where housing is quite expensive, building restrictions appear to have
created these high prices.373

“As demand to live in a particular suburb or city outstrips the existing
housing stock, two things can happen: more housing gets built to meet the
demand, or prices get bid up to ration the existing stock.”374
In fact, the price of housing and individual inability to afford adequate
housing are analytically separate and distinct issues. As Glaeser and
Gyourko note:
In general, housing advocates have confused the role of housing prices
with the role of poverty. Both housing costs and poverty matter for the
well-being of American citizens, but only one of these factors is a housing
issue per se. Certainly, the country should pursue sensible antipoverty
policies, but if housing is not unusually expensive, these policies should
not be put forward as a response to a housing crisis. To us, a housing
affordability crisis means that housing is expensive relative to its
fundamental costs of production—not that people are poor. Therefore, we
will focus entirely on housing prices, not on the distribution of income.
A second key concept in thinking about a housing affordability crisis is
the relevant benchmark for housing costs. Affordability advocates often
argue for the ability to pay (for example, some percentage of income) as a
relevant benchmark, but this again confuses poverty with housing prices.
We believe that a more sensible benchmark is the physical construction
costs of housing. If we believe that there is a housing crisis, then
presumably the correct housing response would be to build more housing.
Yet the social cost of that new housing can never be lower than the cost of
construction. For there to be a “social” gain from new construction,
housing must be priced appreciably above the cost of new construction.375

Jason Furman, former Chair of the President’s Council of Economic
Advisors, recently observed that “excessive . . . land-use or zoning
regulations have consequences that go beyond the housing market to

372. Cal. Legislative Analyst’s Office, California’s High Housing Costs: Causes and
Consequences (2015).
373. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at 23 (emphasis added).
374. Mangin, supra note 172, at 93.
375. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14, at 21.
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impede mobility and thus contribute to rising inequality and declining
productivity growth.”376 Enrico Moretti’s The New Geography of Jobs
provides a more extensive discussion of how land-use regulations restrict
economic development and income mobility.377
Building upon data derived by Paul Emrath,378 the National Association
of Home Builders reported that “average cost for home builders to comply
with regulations for new home construction has increased by nearly 30%
over the last five years.”379 Emrath added that “[i]t really makes it hard to
satisfy the lower end of the market, which is a lot of first-time buyers.”380
A further indication of this is that “[a]cross the U.S., new home
construction has remained at historic lows throughout the housing recovery
of the last five years, but the share of starter homes priced below $200,000
has dwindled more than any other segment, according to U.S. Census
data.”381
Part of the problem of expensive regulation that reduces housing
construction is complex and strict environmental regulation, sometimes
compounded by courts. A pertinent example is the rejection by the
California Supreme Court of the Environmental Impact Report for the Los
Angeles County’s planned Newhall Ranch community, which would house
58,000 people.382 The project had been approved by Los Angeles County
twelve years earlier and had been affirmed as sufficient by the Court of
Appeal.383 Justice Corrigan dissented, concluding that “[t]he majority’s
contrary conclusion is inconsistent with our deferential standard of

376. Jason Furman, Remarks at The Urban Institute, Barriers to Shared Growth: The
Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents (Nov. 20, 2015). See also David
Schleicher, Stuck in Place: Law and the Economic Consequences of Residential Stability,
Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 593 (Jan. 9, 2017), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2896309 [https://perma.cc/5HYQ-WNVJ] (discussing legal impediments to
residential mobility and its economic effects).
377. ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012).
378. Paul Emrath, Government Regulation in the Price of a New Home, NAHB HOUS.
ECON. (May 2, 2016), http://www.nahbclassic.org/generic.aspx?sectionID=734&genericCon
tentID=250611&channelID [https://perma.cc/X9LX-FMMK].
379. Chris Kirkham, Homebuilders Say They Are Squeezed by Rising Compliance Costs,
WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-builders-say-they-are-sque
ezed-by-rising-compliance-costs-1462613401 [https://perma.cc/MF7U-Y55D].
380. Id.
381. Chris Kirkham, Affordable Starter Homes Prove Increasingly Elusive, WALL ST. J.
(May 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/affordable-starter-homes-prove-increasinglyelusive-1462527001 [https://perma.cc/P3YQ-T6ZA].
382. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 361 P.3d 342
(Cal. 2015).
383. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413
(Cal. App. 2014), overruled by Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 383.

358

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

review.”384 The dissent of Justice Chin emphasized not only the
extensiveness of the Report and its review by numerous agencies and lower
courts, but also the harm that would flow from delay.
This litigation has already delayed implementing the EIR some five years
or so. Now this court is sending the case back to the Court of Appeal.
Among other things, it is permitting the project opponents to relitigate
some already decided issues even though the Court of Appeal fully
rejected the arguments the first time . . . . At some point after that [appeal
ends], the EIR will have to be revised, with the necessary period of public
comment, etc . . . . Then it is predictable that yet more litigation will
follow the finalization of the new EIR. Given the glacial pace of
litigation, this will easily take years.
And it gets worse. The majority strongly hints that the time will come
when compliance with goals established for the year 2020 will not be
sufficient, and the proposed project will have to meet some different goals
established for the future beyond 2020. By the time this litigation ends,
and the new EIR is prepared and finalized, we will be much closer to
2020 than when the current EIR was finalized in 2010. Delay can become
its own reward for project opponents. Delay the project long enough and
it has to meet new targets, and then perhaps new targets after that. All
this is a recipe for paralysis. But CEQA [the California Environmental
Quality Act] is not meant to cause paralysis. Carefully planned green
communities are needed to accommodate California’s growing
population. CEQA ensures the informed planning, but it does not prohibit
the planned communities.385

CONCLUSION
The problem of “affordable housing” is a battle of competing metaphors.
For advocates of housing for those with low- and moderate-incomes, it
focuses on those socioeconomic groups to the exclusion of others, and
elides the quite distinct problems of high housing prices and poverty.386
Affordable housing also is closely linked with the problem of “fair
housing,” which entails amelioration of racial exclusion through some
balance of strategies involving classic integration and provision of access
to opportunities. Those viewing these issues through the lens of the local
polity and its entrenched economic and political interests frame them
differently from those who do not.387 Maintaining rootedness in existing
communities is another concern, although interest groups fighting

384. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 361 P.3d at 366 (Corrigan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
385. Id. at 373 (Chin, J., dissenting).
386. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
387. See Iglesias, supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
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gentrification and those fighting change in upper-income communities
frame the issues quite differently.388 High housing prices exacerbate
poverty and exclusion and harm regional economies and the national
economy.389 While all of these separate problems interact in a myriad of
ways, we should be aware that metaphors leading to inconsistent patterns
of issue conflation do not lead to effective solutions.390
The removal of barriers to what we term “affordable housing” might be
accomplished through an unlikely democratic expression of broad popular
will. However, more likely are complex and opaque bargains among
legislators and interest groups or active micro-management by federal or
state agencies and courts, all of which are often apt to be largely counterproductive as well as intrusive.
The metaphors of “affordable housing” collectively serve largely to
obfuscate both issues and possible solutions.

388. See supra Section I.E.
389. See Hsieh & Moretti, supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
390. See JACOBS, supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

